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ABSTRACT
That Seems Right: Reasoning, Inference, and the Feeling of Correctness
Jeremy Wolos
In my dissertation, I advance and defend a broad account of reasoning, including 
both the nature of inference and the structure of our reasoning systems. With respect to 
inference, I argue that we have good reason to consider a unified account of the cognitive 
transitions through which we attempt to figure things out. This view turns out to be 
highly inflationary relative to previous philosophical accounts of inference, which, I 
argue, fail to accommodate many instances of everyday reasoning. I argue that a 
cognitive transition’s status as an inference, in this broad sense, depends on the subject’s 
taking the conclusion of the inference— a new, revised, or supposed belief— to follow 
from a trustworthy internal process. Furthermore, taking such a belief to follow from a 
trustrworthy process consists in its accompaniment by the feeling of correctness to the 
subject, which I call the assent affect. With respect to the structure of our reasoning 
systems, I defend a dual process model of reasoning by addressing certain alleged 
deficiencies with such accounts. I argue that the assent affect— or more precisely its 
absence— is a strong candidate to serve as the triggering condition of our type 2 
reasoning processes. That is, a subject’s more effortful reasoning processes engage with a 
problem when the output of a type 1 intuition is not accompanied by the assent affect. 
This account, I argue, fits well with both empirical and theoretical claims about the 
interaction of dual reasoning processes. In this dissertation, I use the assent affect to solve 
puzzles about both the nature of inferences and the structure of our reasoning systems. 
Puzzles in rationality become easier to solve when our intellectual feelings are not 
excluded from the picture.
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Chapter 1 – Inferences and the assent affect 
 
1. Introduction 
 Thinking consists of thoughts and the transitions between them. The metaphysics 
of mind ought to be concerned not only with what types of thoughts we have, but also 
with how we get from one to the next. This chapter focuses on the class of cognitive 
transitions that are involved in reasoning. What can we say about the cognitive transitions 
through which we attempt to figure things out?  
I call my target phenomenon in this chapter “inference,” but my construal is 
highly inflationary relative to previous accounts. A prominent philosophical tradition on 
inference began with Frege (1881/1979) and has resurfaced recently in the work of Paul 
Boghossian (2014), Crispin Wright (2014), and John Broome (2013, 2014). This tradition 
holds inferences to a formal standard. On such a view, an inference is a transition from 
content to content, based on paradigmatically deductive rule-following. Accounts along 
these lines are, to varying degrees, oriented towards explaining certain special 
epistemological properties of inference: how are inferred beliefs justified by the beliefs 
that precede them?  
When we reason, we often reach new beliefs in ways that are not captured by this 
type of traditional, formal account of inference. This is not an accident: such accounts 
generally do not aspire to explain the transitions that serve much of our everyday 
reasoning, which may not meet a formal standard. We can make this clear with a few 
examples: 




(b) A father reasons that, due to a spike in shark attacks in South Africa, he 
should not allow his children to swim during their Cape Cod vacation, a 
fallacy of weak induction. 
(c) While absent-mindedly playing a game on her smartphone, a woman solves a 
puzzle by relying on a primitive matching bias rather than rule-based 
reasoning. 
Accounts of inference in the Frege-Boghossian tradition are designed to explain 
phenomena like (a). I will argue that they are worse at explaining both bad and inductive 
inferences, like (b). And such accounts do not regard (c) as an inference, even while 
reasoning like (c) may be functionally very similar to more “proper” inferences. 
I am interested in all three of these. A number of cognitive transitions result in 
beliefs and serve our reasoning activity, and I intend to give a unified account of these 
transitions. There are several reasons to be interested in a unified account of the cognitive 
transitions that factor into reasoning— to be interested in an account of inference broadly 
construed. 
First, the commonsense category of inference includes each of the cognitive 
transitions above. Anytime a subject regards herself as having engaged in good 
reasoning, the event ought to be considered an inference by a commonsense standard. 
The unified account I offer in this chapter can be regarded as an account of commonsense 
inference. Boghossian agrees that a subject’s regard for her own reasoning is important to 
a transition’s status as an inference, but in Section 2 I will argue that his account is not 
well-equipped to extend to the full range of transitions I am considering. 
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Second, a unified account is useful because inferences that meet a formal standard 
and those that do not have quite a lot in common. They often serve the same reasoning 
functions, and it may be difficult to distinguish between a rule-based inference that meets 
a formal standard and a cognitive transition that has traditionally been considered sub-
inferential. By offering an account of the general category to which all inferences 
(broadly construed) belong, we can more easily understand different types of inference 
and the relations between them. We will also be better able to individuate particular 
inferences, accounting for both a “macro” inference a subject might perform when 
reaching a grand conclusion, as well as the constituent inferences that served that broader 
goal. 
 Finally, a broad, unified account of inference will be useful in addressing other 
types of questions about cognition. The later chapters of this dissertation are devoted to 
dual process models of reasoning. Very generally, the dual process hypothesis is that 
there are two distinct types of cognitive activity under the umbrella of “reasoning”: one is 
fast, automatic, effortless; the other is slow, deliberate, effortful. Despite the prominence 
of dual process models, I believe that the literature is missing a coherent account of the 
category of cognitive events over which the dual process hypothesis quantifies: what 
comes in two varieties? I intend the unified account of inference I offer in this chapter to 
fill this void. My construal of inference, by design, admits any instance of Type 1 or 
Type 2 reasoning. The account of inference in this chapter will fix the target phenomena 
for the dual process model of reasoning I develop in the following chapters, and will be 
essential as I respond to certain recent critiques of such models. 
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 I argue that an inference (broadly construed) involves a subject’s taking a new or 
revised belief1 to be the output of a trustworthy internal process. This represents a 
departure from the Frege-Boghossian tradition on inference, which places requirements 
on the subject’s attitude towards the premises that lead to an inferred conclusion. In order 
to infer, Boghossian says a subject must take her premises to support her conclusion. I 
argue that such an account, in which the subject must have access to the causal history of 
inferred belief, is not extendable to the broader category of inference I wish to consider.  
Once our orientation of “taking” is shifted towards conclusion-beliefs rather than 
premise-beliefs, it is necessary to consider what it means to take a belief to be the output 
of a trustworthy internal process. I argue that the best candidate to serve this taking 
function in all inferences— both good and bad— is the feeling of correctness that 
accompanies inferred beliefs. I argue that this feeling is the phenomenology that 
accompanies the intuition that a conclusion-belief followed from a trustworthy internal 
process. I refer to the feeling as the “assent affect,” and argue that its presence is 
sufficient for a cognitive transition to count as an inference.  
 
 In Section 2, I will consider certain general features of inferences. I will argue that 
an inference is a causal process resulting in the endorsement of a belief. Boghossian’s 
recent account of inference holds that this endorsement consists of a subject “taking” her 
premises to support her conclusion. I will agree with intuition behind Boghossian’s 
“taking condition” on inference, but I will argue that it cannot be extended to include a 
number of commonsense inferences. In Section 2.2, I will argue that subjects may be 
																																																								
1 There is a subset of inferences which to not yield beliefs: hypothetical inferences. I will discuss 
these cases in Section 3, where I argue that they are a subcategory of intellectual inferences. 
These are exceptional rather than typical cases, on my view. 
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ignorant of or confused about the premises on which an inference was in fact based, and I 
will dismiss the view that inference requires a subject to take her premises to be a 
particular way. I will also argue, relatedly but distinctly, that subjects are often blind to 
the rules linking their premises with their apparently inferred conclusion. I conclude that 
taking cannot involve the premises of an inferred belief to be any particular way at all. 
 Having dismissed this construal of taking, one is left with two options, which I 
consider in Section 3. One can deny that inferences involve taking at all, or one can argue 
that inference involves a form of taking that does not involve regard for either an inferred 
belief’s premises or the rules tying premises to conclusions. I deny the first option and 
accept the second. A version of the first-option has recently been endorsed by Jake 
Quilty-Dunn and Eric Mandelbaum. I will argue that accounts along these lines struggle 
to give appropriate individuation conditions for inference. 
In Section 4, I will catalogue the diverse types of inference that ought to be 
included in a unified account, and I will argue that the view I lay out is best positioned to 
cover them all.  
 In Section 5, I will explain what it is for a subject to take a conclusion to follow 
from a trustworthy internal process. Here, I will develop my account of the assent affect, 
the phenomenology that accompanies all commonsense inference. I will argue that the 
mere presence of this feeling and the intuition it reflects is sufficient for a cognitive 




 Before I move on to discuss the general features of inference, I would like to 
briefly discuss the historical basis of the relevance of phenomenology to accounts of 
reasoning. 
Wittgenstein, a pivotal figure in the rule-following tradition about inference that I 
hope to subvert, occasionally describes the process of inference in phenomenological 
terms. In his Investigations §219, he describes what it is like to infer based on a rule that 
has been internalized: 
“All the steps are really already taken” means: I no longer have any choice. The 
rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to 
be followed through the whole of space. – But if something of this sort really 
were the case, how would it help? 
No; my description only made sense if it was to be understood symbolically. – I 
should have said: This is how it strikes me. When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I 
obey the rule blindly. 
 
Crispin Wright notes about this passage that “blindness” here refers to the 
phenomenology of immediacy— to follow a rule one has internalized may feel as if one 
is not following a rule at all (2007, 490). There is something it is like, in other words, to 
obey an inference rule on a Wittgensteinian picture. 
 I do not intend to argue that Wittgenstein would agree with the particular account 
of inference I am going to offer, or for the claims that follow to hinge upon interpretation 
of Wittgenstein. This excerpt is meant merely to note the persistent impulse among 
philosophers to describe the most fundamental trustworthy internal processes in terms of 
feelings and phenomenology. These excerpts highlight that the issues surrounding 
inference have historically been difficult to account for without incorporating or 





2. The general features of inference 
 
2.1 “Taking” and other conditions on inference 
 
In this section, I will develop some initial conditions on inference. I will agree 
with Boghossian about certain critical features, but I will argue that his account cannot be 
extended to cover the full range of commonsense inferences, as I intend to. 
Inferences are transitions that result in conclusions. In general, these conclusions 
will be beliefs; in cases of supposition, we infer hypothetical conclusions we do not 
necessarily believe. For ease of explanation, I will proceed in this section as if all 
inferences result in beliefs. In Section 4, once my view has been laid out, I will explain 
how cases of supposition—a subcategory of inference— fit into the picture. 
Inferences come in different forms: sometimes we might infer a new belief, other 
times we might infer that an existing belief ought to be adjusted or revised, and still other 
times we might “check our work” via inference, confirming an existing belief.  
One straightforward preliminary is that one must infer from some basis. If I 
announce that I have inferred that it will rain tomorrow, my audience will be curious to 
hear from what I have inferred the weather of the future. Perhaps the basis of this 
inference is the projection on a weather app, or perhaps the basis of this inference is a 
pattern that I have personally observed— maybe my elbows itch at the moment, as they 
often do the day before a rainstorm. The quality of these potential bases of inferences 
notwithstanding, one cannot make an entirely baseless inference. In other words, if I were 
to respond to my audience’s question by saying, “I have inferred that it will rain 
tomorrow from no basis whatsoever,” they would correctly deny that I had made an 
inference at all.  
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I am very liberal about what might serve as the basis for an inferred belief. 
Others, like Boghossian, have argued that the basis of an inferred belief must be some 
prior belief or set of beliefs. My eventual account will be much more inclusive about 
what might have figured into the causal history of an inferred belief  
My goal is to produce a set of necessary conditions for a cognitive transition to 
count as an inference. These conditions should conjointly be sufficient for a transition’s 
status as inference. So far, I have agreed with Boghossian on two initial conditions: 
(a) the transition results in a new, revised, or reaffirmed belief 
(b) this belief is caused by some prior states or events 
 
Not all transitions meeting these conditions should count as inferences, however. 
Consider how the problem of deviant causal chains might apply in cases of inference. 
Suppose that my cell phone rings, which causes me to believe my phone is ringing, which 
causes me to reach my hand towards my pocket, which causes an overzealous police 
officer to shoot me, which causes me to believe I have been shot. While my belief that 
my phone is ringing is part of the causal explanation for my belief that I have been shot, 
it is incorrect to say that I inferred from the fact that my phone is ringing that I have been 
shot. One belief does not count as inferred from another simply because the latter 
appeared in the causal chain preceding the former. 
What more is necessary for an inference? Boghossian observes that, in order for a 
new or revised belief to count as having been inferred, there must be some constraint on 
the subject’s attitude towards the apparently inferred belief. Specifically, the subject must 
take this belief to be a conclusion that is supported by some other facts that the subject 
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believes to be true. Boghossian follows Frege along these lines: “To make a judgment 
because we are cognisant of other truths as providing a justification for it is known as 
inferring” (Frege 1881/1979, 3). Boghossian correctly notes, however, that Frege’s 
definition includes a type of success grammar, in that it suggests that the premises from 
which an inference follows need to be true. Instead, Boghossian contends that the thinker 
must merely presume that these premises are true and take their judgment to be supported 
by them. This provision importantly allows for the possibility of bad reasoning. 
Boghossian calls this his “taking condition” on inferences:  
Taking: “Inferring necessarily involves the thinker taking his premises to support 
his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of that fact” (4).  
Boghossian holds, in other words, that inference is a cognitive transition in which a 
subject tries to determine what might follow from what she already believes to be true.  
But how widespread is the phenomenon that Boghossian’s taking condition 
accommodates? In formal academic settings, it is common for subjects to reason by 
explicitly considering existing beliefs, and then deciding what conclusion it is appropriate 
to draw from those beliefs. I will refer to this type of inference as paradigmatic inference. 
A chemist might infer from a pattern of lab results that some new scientific law is true; 
that is, she takes the generalized law to be supported inductively by her lab results. A 
mathematician might infer that a certain theorem is true from a formal proof; she takes 
the theorem’s truth to be deductively guaranteed by the steps in the proof. Note that 
neither of these examples depends on the conclusion-belief actually being true. Either 
inference might be bad. The chemist’s lab assistant might have systematically mishandled 
some aspect of the experiment and the mathematician may have misapplied a rule in her 
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deductive proof. In neither case does the mistake deprive the thinker’s transition of its 
status as an inference, but merely renders it a bad inference. All that matters for the 
relevant transition to qualify as an inference is that the subject takes the conclusion-belief 
to follow from her premise-beliefs. 
I believe, however, that there are many cases of inference in which the premise-
beliefs and the rule on which the processing is based are not just implicit, but inaccessible 
to the subject. Given the existence of cases along these lines, like cases where an 
inference is based on a probabilistic Bayesian algorithm, it does not seem apt to say that a 
subject has “taken” the premises or rule to be any way at all. A full accounting of the 
variety of good and bad inferences encourages an account on which a subject takes her 
conclusion to be a certain way.  
I believe our third condition for a cognitive transition to count as an inference 
should be a version of the taking condition broader than the one Boghossian offers. I will 
defend the following condition, which I will call Taking*. 
Taking*: A cognitive transition resulting in a conclusion-belief qualifies as an 
inference if the subject takes the conclusion-belief to follow from a trustworthy 
internal process. 
 
I will say much more about Taking*, including what it means for a subject to take a 
conclusion-belief to follow from a trustworthy internal process. For now, I want to note 
that unlike Boghossian’s taking condition as described above, Taking* shifts the subject’s 
focus; rather than taking the premise-beliefs she is considering to support the conclusion-
belief as on Boghossian’s view, no consideration of premise-beliefs is implied by 
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Taking*. Instead, the subject must merely consider the conclusion-belief— the newly 
formed belief— and take it to follow from a trustworthy internal process. I will first argue 
for this reorientation, and then I will argue that taking a belief to follow from a 
trustworthy internal process involves the presence of a certain phenomenological 
datum— the feeling of correctness— which I call the assent affect. 
 So far, Taking* has been offered mostly as a matter of stipulation, without a full 
defense (though some may find, as I do, that it has significant intuitive appeal). In Section 
2.2, I will argue that subjects are often blind to the premises leading to their inference. I 
will also argue, relatedly but distinctly, that subjects are often blind to the rules linking 
their premise-beliefs with their apparently inferred belief. I will conclude that a 
transition’s status as an inference cannot require the subject to take the preceding 
premises and rules of an apparently inferred belief to be any particular way; in other 
words, that Taking* is preferable to Taking. 
  
2.2 Ignorance of the premises and rules of an inferred belief 
I argued in the previous section that an inference must meet these two conditions: 
(a) the transition results in a new, revised, or reaffirmed belief 
(b) this belief is caused by some prior states or events 
I also argued that merely meeting these conditions is insufficient for a cognitive transition 
to count as an inference. Boghossian offers Taking as a third condition: 
Taking: “Inferring necessarily involves the thinker taking his premises to support 
his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of that fact” (4).  
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In this section, I will deny Taking by arguing that there are cases in which subjects are 
ignorant of or blind to the premises on which an inferred belief is based. In fact, I will 
cast my argument even more broadly: I will argue that there are cases in which a subject 
is not only to the premise-beliefs, but also to the rule linking the premise-beliefs to the 
inferred belief. As I will demonstrate, it is often very difficult to clearly differentiate 
between what counts as a premise and what counts as a rule. Because of this ambiguity, I 
will consider both premise-blindness, which straightforwardly contradicts Taking, and 
rule-blindness, the presence of which encourages my broader claim that the relevant 
sense of taking cannot involve orientation towards an inferred belief’s premises and rules. 
 It is important to note here that some of my disagreement with Boghossian 
emerges from the fact that he is interested in a more limited set of inferences than I am. 
He would likely deny that some of the inferences I consider are within the purview of his 
account. Some of the cases I consider, however, like fallacies of weak induction, do seem 
to me as if they should count in even Boghossian’s more restricted category. So, while I 
do think my present remarks demonstrate some shortcomings of Boghossian’s view, my 
present aim is not to parse the precise boundaries of the category of inference as he draws 
them. Instead, I will consider only the broad category of inference I have defined as my 
target, and I will argue that Boghossian’s account is insufficient to cover it. 
 First, I would like to lay out what I mean by premise/rule ambiguity more 
directly. When formalizing certain types of arguments, the rule or rules in virtue of which 
the premises support the conclusion are sometimes included in the sets of premises. This 
is usually not the case in formal deductive arguments: 
1. A B 
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2. A  
3. B      via Modus Ponens (1, 2) 
 
In deductive arguments like this one, it would be strange to include the “modus ponens” 
rule as a premise. It is no problem on a view like Boghossian’s for a subject to be 
ignorant of modus ponens even if she can still make this inference from these premises. 
As long as she takes these premises to support the conclusion, she can satisfy Taking. 
 The case is somewhat different when it comes to inductive arguments. Here, it is 
more natural to include a rule-like premise. Consider the following popular broad-strokes 
reconstruction of an argument central to Hume’s problem of induction: 
1. The sun has risen every day. 
2. The future is likely to resemble the past. 
3. The sun will rise tomorrow. 
 
Here, 2 is included as a premise, when it could also be construed as an inductive rule in 
virtue of which premise 1 supports the inferred conclusion 3. If 2 is included as a 
premise, then Boghossian’s account would require that the subject takes 1 and 2 to 
support 3, and draws her conclusion 3 because of that fact. Consider the psychology of 
someone inferring that the sun will rise tomorrow. It seems far more natural to say that 
she takes this conclusion to be well founded in a trustworthy internal process— i.e., that 
Taking* is met— than it does to say that all such subjects take premise 2 to be true, even 
in a minimal sense of Taking that does not require conscious reflection on that premise. 
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 This intuitive appeal of Taking* relative to Taking is bolstered by considering 
examples of fallacies of weak induction. Fallacious inferences still ought to meet the 
sufficient conditions for an inference. For example, consider a subject, Swimmer, who 
takes his son to the beach on Cape Cod, where he overhears a story about a shark attack 
in South Africa. His immediate response might be, “Perhaps it isn’t smart to go 
swimming in the ocean this summer.” This appears to be an inference, in that he has 
endorsed a conclusion-belief that he takes to follow from certain premise-beliefs. We 
might formalize his inference: 
1. There was recently a shark attack in South Africa. 
2. It is not smart to swim in the ocean this summer. 
 
Note that in this case I have avoided including a rule-like premise, as in the Humean 
example above.  
 It is unintuitive to say that Swimmer has taken the rule his inference relied 
upon— a weak analogy or hasty generalization rule of along the lines of “shark attacks in 
one place indicate that shark attacks anywhere are likely”— to be any way at all. 
Swimmer is rule-blind, in that he probably would not have endorsed this conclusion if he 
considered the rule: he would not believe that it is not smart to swim in the ocean this 
summer.  
Of course, rule-blindness is compatible with Taking: someone could take a 
premise to support a conclusion without taking any particular rule to link them. Taking 
requires only that a subject takes certain premises to support the inferred conclusion. 
While Swimmer may not be unaware of this premise, I find it uncomfortable to say that 
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Swimmer endorses his conclusion because he takes it to follow from this premise and this 
premise alone. If we were to ask Swimmer why he believes it is unsafe to swim, would 
he list the single premise above and stop there? It seems far more likely that subjects 
would, when asked to explain the premises that led them to a (bad) inferred conclusion, 
attempt to rationalize their conclusion post hoc with a stronger, more complete set of 
premises than the veridical set of premises on which their original inference was based. 
That is, as soon as a subject’s attention is directed to the causal history of a poorly 
informed belief, they do not take their original, veridical premises to be sufficient for 
inferring the conclusion.  
The most natural thing to say about subjects who make bad inferences is that they 
do so because they are not regarding the causal history— both premises and rules— of 
their conclusion-belief very carefully.  
 In order to make this point even more clear, consider the example of safe 
consensual sex between siblings, popularized by Jonathan Haidt (2001). In this test, 
subjects are presented with a brief story: 
Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in France on 
summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near 
the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making 
love. At the very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was 
already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. 
They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that 
night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other. What 
do you think about that? Was it OK for them to make love? (Haidt 814). 
 
Haidt notes that a large majority of subjects respond that it is not acceptable for these 
siblings to have had sex, and then subsequently begin searching for reasons. Haidt notes 
that they often cite concerns about inbreeding and emotional damage, even though the 
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story explicitly rules out these problems. Eventually, subjects often say something along 
the lines of, “I can’t explain it; it’s just wrong” (ibid).  
 Subjects in this case are making an inference: they are reaching a conclusion-
belief, namely their judgment that this sex act is wrong. An account that denies that this 
type of case is an inference must also exclude much other everyday reasoning, good or 
bad, that is structured similarly. The subjects in this case seem unable, however, to 
articulate the premises in virtue of which they inferred this conclusion. Their suggestions 
about inbreeding and emotional damage could not be the veridical premises that led to the 
inference, because dismissing these premises does not lessen their inclination to accept 
the conclusion. Taking is not able to cover this type of case, as it claims that an inference 
necessarily involves a subject taking premises to support a conclusion, and endorsing the 
conclusion because of that fact. In this case, it seems that the subjects are not endorsing 
the conclusion in virtue of their taking any premises to be any way whatsoever. Taking* 
seems much better here; subjects are endorsing this conclusion because they are taking 
the conclusion to be the output of a trustworthy internal process, even though they are 
unable to articulate that trustworthy internal process at all. If a subject is not aware of the 
premises that led to an inference, it is difficult to say that she took these premises to be 
any particular way. 
There are other types of reasoning in which subjects are blind to the veridical 
premises in virtue of which they judge a certain conclusion to be true. Consider the well-
known Wason selection task. In the Wason selection test, subjects fail at a deductive 
reasoning task at rates as high as 96% (Oaksford & Chater). In one example of this task, 
subjects are shown four cards on a table, each of which they are told has a color on one 
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side and a number on the other: solid red, solid brown, the number 3, and the number 8. 
Subjects are then asked which card or cards they must turn over to test the truth of the 
proposition, “If a card shows an even number on one side, then it must be red on the 
opposite side.” This proposition can only be invalidated by a card that has an even 
number on one side but is not red on the other, so the 8 and the brown card should be 
turned. Most subjects respond that the 8 and the red card should be turned. 
The interpretation of the results in these cases is controversial. Evans 
hypothesizes that this common false response is produced by an associative matching 
bias, an example of what is often called a Type 1 process: “red” and “even” are named 
explicitly in the prompt. Oaksford and Chater argue that the results might be better 
interpreted as adhering to probabilistic processes. Oaksford and Chater argue that 
subjects’ standard, incorrect responses to deductive prompts like the Wason selection task 
might actually be a byproduct of generally reliable everyday reasoning processes, though 
they argue that reasoning in these cases does not proceed according to learned deductive 
rules about the material conditional operator, as standard interpretations of the Wason 
results hold. In everyday reasoning, Oaksford and Chater argue, subjects assess not the 
strict logical rules of conditionals, but rather whether there is a dependency relation that 
may admit exceptions. For example, subjects may endorse the conditional “If something 
is a bird, then it flies,” and they may understand that accepting “Tweety is a bird” means 
that they must also accept “Tweety flies.” But, if it turns out that Tweety is a flightless 
bird, this means that the conditional they accepted was defeasible in this everyday rather 
than formal context (Oaksford and Chater 349). Subjects interpret this prompt as a 
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dependency relation rather than a strict logical conditional: it is a type of rule that may 
bear exceptions. 
 In the version of the Wason task discussed above, subjects are asked to evaluate 
the conditional, “If a card shows an even number on one side, then it must be red on the 
opposite side.” Let us call “a card shows an even number on one side” p, and “it must be 
red on the opposite side” q. By Oaksford and Chater’s hypothesis, subjects begin the task 
assuming that there is an equal (.5) probability that p and q are dependent or independent 
of each other; subjects are fully uncertain about whether p and q are dependent or 
independent. They then select the cards that will provide the greatest reduction in this 
uncertainty, according to Bayes’ theorem. If following Bayes’ theorem correctly, and if 
subjects make what is known as the “rarity assumption”— namely that the probabilities 
of both p and q are low— then turning over the card with the even number and the red 
card will in fact be a rational strategy (Oaksford and Chater 351). 
 There is significant debate in the literature over whether Oaksford and Chater’s 
“expected information gain” account is the best explanation of the Wason task. Evans and 
Over (1996), for example, have argued that Oaksford and Chater’s model is 
psychologically implausible, and furthermore that the “rarity assumption” would only be 
rational in certain formulations of the Wason task, such as when the apparent dependence 
is between colors and certain letters (rather than odd vs. even numbers, where the 
probability is even).  
 It is beyond my ambition here to resolve the debate about the type of processing 
on which standard responses to the Wason task rely. Regardless of whether subjects reach 
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their conclusions via associative or Bayesian processing, it seems clear that they are 
thoroughly blind to the details of the causal history of that conclusion.  
 One may be tempted to deny that common responses to the Wason task are 
inferential. Such an objection would say that only the subjects who reasoned through the 
problem carefully have made inferences. My goal in this paper is to accommodate all 
types of reasoning into my account; I want to give an account of the category to which 
both the “Type 1” associative/Bayesian process and the “Type 2” effortful process 
belong. I believe that there is quite a lot in common in terms of the phenomenology of 
any response to the Wason task; both the correct and incorrect subjects take themselves to 
have reasoned through the problem correctly. 
Either way the results of the Wason task are interpreted, the subjects seem to be 
blind to the details of the causal history of their conclusion. Taking, though focused on a 
narrower range of cognitive transitions that I am at present, requires that subjects take the 
premises of their inference to support its conclusion. This seems incompatible with cases 
like this; it seems subjects in the Wason task are premise-blind. 
The proponent of Taking, or a similar causal-history account targeting a broader 
category of inference, could argue that much of what is contestable in the debate between 
the associative and the Bayesian explanations is about processing rather than premises. 
That is, she could argue that subjects are blind to the nature of the rule-following that 
their inferences follow rather than blind to the premises themselves. But this response 
will only go so far. If the Bayesian explanation is the veridical explanation of poor 
performances on the Wason task, then subjects rely upon the rarity assumption, which is 
critical for the argument to go through, and which is difficult to construe as a rule rather 
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than a premise. It is very unnatural to say that a subject endorses her conclusion because 
she takes the rarity assumption to be true. There are likely to be analogous implicit 
premise-beliefs in other cases of probabilistic inference.  
Regardless of the correct explanation of the reasoning that leads to the incorrect 
inference on the Wason task, the most natural thing to say is that the subjects seem to 
have not thought very hard about the conclusion they reached. Daniel Kahneman 
discusses the phenomenon of “cognitive ease” at length: subjects prefer to answer 
prompts in a way that will prevent them from having to engage in the type of mental 
strain that might be necessary to reason through a task like Wason (2011, 62). In the final 
section of this chapter, I will discuss cognitive ease in greater detail, and it will figure 
centrally into my claim that an inference occurs when a subject takes a conclusion-belief 
to follow from a trustworthy internal process, as signaled by the feeling of correctness, or 
the assent affect. 
In this subsection, I considered cases where subjects seem blind to the details of 
the causal history of an inferred belief, and more specifically blind to the premises on the 
basis of which a new inferred belief is endorsed. The examples of everyday (especially 
weak) induction, Haidt’s incestuous siblings, and the Wason selection task make clear 
that a causal history construal like Boghossian’s Taking cannot be extended to cover the 
unified category of inference I am considering. If a subject is not aware of the premises 
that led to a conclusion, it is not clear how she could have endorsed that conclusion 
because she takes those premises to support it.  
Once we dismiss the causal history construal of Taking, we are left with two 
options. One option, which I have already argued is a natural and intuitive interpretation 
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of the data, is to accept Taking*, on which an inference occurs when a subject takes her 
conclusion to follow from a trustworthy internal process without regard for the details of 
that process. In the following section, I will consider and reject a second option: that an 
account of inference can be delivered without any construal of taking.  
 
3. The rule-following option 
3.1 The bare inferential transition account 
So far, I have demonstrated that inference does not involve a subject’s taking the 
premises or rules on which an inferred belief is based to be any particular way. I have, 
along the way, presented arguments that Taking*, which does not require a subject’s 
regard for the details of an inferred belief’s causal history, is a preferable condition for 
inference over Taking. Before I conclude that Taking* is the correct requirement on 
inference, however, I must first consider the possibility that inference does not involve 
taking at all. On this type of view, some other factor must be responsible for elevating 
certain cognitive transitions to the status of inference. The most prominent views along 
these lines have held that a cognitive transition counts as an inference in virtue of its 
proceeding via a particular type of rule. I will discuss the recent account offered by Jake 
Quilty-Dunn and Eric Mandelbaum in particular. 
Before discussing their account in particular, I want to briefly discuss in general 
the role that rules and rule-following play in inference. In the paradigm reasoning cases 
of the chemist and the mathematician, the subjects make a cognitive transition from 
certain premises to a conclusion they take to follow from those premises. For John 
Broome (2012) the appeal of a rule-following view of inference emerges from 
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epistemological considerations: the rule is what justifies the inference, and following a 
rule explains how the inference was made. Boghossian (2014) offers a speculative rule-
following view based on similar epistemological considerations, but he acknowledges 
considerable difficulty in developing a view along these lines, and explicitly declines to 
offer more than a speculative rule-based construal of Taking (17).  
 There is no shortage of discussion of rule-following in the post-Wittgenstein 
literature, and it is well known that profound philosophical challenges arise from the 
consideration of the psychological role that rules play. What type of facts are rules such 
that they can exist independently and objectively from any particular application? Given 
their generality, how can rules be sufficiently specific to any instance— how do we know 
that we are not applying Kripke’s quus rule when we mean to perform addition? How do 
we grasp these objective yet relevant rules and wield them so readily in our psychological 
practice? These are important questions about which I wish to remain largely silent. My 
present concerns are neither normative nor epistemological— I will not address the 
curious property of premises by which they might confer justification upon an inferred 
conclusion. I am building a descriptive account: what makes certain cognitive transitions 
unique in that they qualify as inferences? Jake Quilty-Dunn and Eric Mandelbaum (2015) 
have recently advanced a descriptive, naturalistic account of inference, on which a rule-
following requirement for inference can render irrelevant a taking condition like 
Boghossian’s or mine. 
 Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum (QDM, henceforth) build an account on which 
inferences are unconscious transitions that are necessarily based on rules built into our 
cognitive architecture. They call the minimal unit of inference a basic inferential 
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transition, or BIT. They claim that a cognitive transition qualifies as a BIT iff (i) the 
states involved are discursive rather than iconic, (ii) the relationship between the states is 
described by a logical rule built into our cognitive architecture, and (iii) the inference is 
processed based on this rule rather than some other factor (11-12). The notion of “built 
into the architecture” does quite a lot of work here. QDM define that notion as: 
“A rule is built into the architecture of a representational system iff the system is 
constructed in such a way that, if a mental representation is tokened that satisfies 
the antecedent of the rule, then, ceteris paribus, the system will generate a token 
representation that satisfies the consequent of that rule.” (10) 
 
On QDM’s view, a subject infers from “If it is raining, I should bring an umbrella” and 
“it is raining,” to “I should bring an umbrella” because the logical structure of her 
discursive representations of the premises tokens a modus ponens rule that is built into 
her cognitive architecture. Similarly, she can make a conjuctive inference along the lines 
of “the dog is big” and “the dog is smelly” to “the dog is big and smelly” because a rule 
like If X is A and X is B, then X is AB is built into her architecture. The subject’s mental 
representations of the premises token the rule’s antecedent, thus unconsciously triggering 
endorsement of the rule’s consequent.   
QDM distinguish BITs from rich inferential transitions, or RITs, in that in the 
latter type of inference, the subject is disposed to endorse the cognitive transition itself 
(21). That is, when reasoning with RITs, the subject explicitly takes her premise to 
support her conclusion— she meets Taking in Boghossian’s sense. More specifically, 
QDM hold that a subject explicitly takes her premise A to support her conclusion B when 
she is disposed to form a thought along the lines of “A therefore B,” where “therefore” is 
a concept requiring some appreciation of logic (ibid). In the case of a mere BIT rather 
than a RIT, a subject can only be said to meet Taking in a minimal, implicit sense: she 
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takes her premise to support her conclusion insofar as the former caused the latter in 
virtue of a built-in rule. For QDM, “RITs are distinguished from BITs not in how the 
conclusion thought is produced, but simply in that the thinker is additionally disposed to 
endorse the inference” (22). That is, there both BITs and RITs are processed via the same 
built-in-rule, but only in the case of an RIT does the subject explicitly take the conclusion 
to be supported by the premises. 
QDM argue that Boghossian’s Taking condition serves two purposes: (a) to offer 
a satisfactory causal explanation of the transition from a premise-belief to a conclusion-
belief (in my terminology) and (b) to explain the transfer of justification from premise to 
conclusion (22). Like QDM, I am not concerned with (b). With respect to (a), QDM 
believe that their account is a satisfactory causal explanation of the transitions involved in 
inferences—both BITs and RITs— and that as a result, a taking condition is unnecessary. 
We infer B from A because an unconscious logical rule built into our cognitive 
architecture is triggered by the token A. 
QDM’s account seems to face some difficulty when it comes to the individuation 
of inferences. This is especially vivid when we consider inferences that intuitively rely 
upon rules that are not plausibly built into our cognitive architecture. Questions like this 
are common on standardized tests:  
 If x  y means 2x+5y, what is 3  8? 
In solving this question, we go from a mental representation involving “3  8” to a 
mental representation that “3  8 = 46” is the right answer. Intuitively, this is an 
inference based on the  rule. Of course, the  rule is not built into our cognitive 
architecture. QDM would have to argue that we solve this question via a chain of BITs, 
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each requiring a suitably abstract conditional rule so as to accommodate new rules. Some 
of the BITs involved might require a rule like If a new operator is introduced, replace the 
symbol with more familiar operators in the new operator’s definition.  
 If you asked a test-taker, Cindy, how many inferences she made when solving this 
problem, she would say “one.” We might call the one inference she means the “macro-
inference”; in the macro-inference, she inferred “3  8 = 46” from the prompt and the 
definition of  . On QDM’s view, she has made several BITs in order to get to this 
inference, but the macro-inference does not count as a BIT. 
 Is it an RIT?  On QDM’s view, a RIT differs from a BIT only in the subject’s 
disposition to endorse the transition. The macro-inference in this case differs from its 
constituent BITs in more than the presence of this disposition: it is not a single BIT at all, 
since the  rule is not built into her cognitive architecture, but rather an agglomeration of 
BITs. If the macro-inference is not a BIT or an RIT, it seems that Cindy must be incorrect 
in calling it an inference.  
 I do not object to the idea that “macro-inferences” like the one Cindy endorses in 
this case rely on significant unconscious processing, nor do I object to the idea that this 
unconscious, underlying processing involves logical rules built into her cognitive 
architecture. I furthermore grant that some of this unconscious processing may involve 
inferences. I do think it is an uncomfortable consequence for QDM, however, that Cindy 
would be incorrect on their view to say that she inferred “3  8 = 46” (the conclusion) 
from the prompt (the premise) and the definition of  (the rule). 
 Note also that this problem applies more broadly than cases of novel rule 
definitions. An analogous problem would arise in any case of an inference based on a rule 
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that combined multiple built-in rules. It is unlikely, for example, that DeMorgan’s Law is 
built into our architecture. When I transition to the representation that (~P ∧~Q) from the 
representation that ~(P∨Q), this probably relies on many underlying BITs. And yet the 
only inference I am intuitively inclined to describe as such in this case does not rely on a 
built-in rule, and is thus not as easily accommodated under QDM’s view as BITs, which 
seem to belong to a category I am less inclined to call inference.  
Furthermore, it is not obvious to me that I am incapable of making a DeMorgan’s 
inference that veridically relied upon the non-built-in rule. If I am presented with a step in 
a proof where DeMorgan’s Law is applicable, it seems I might be able to entertain the 
premise-belief in my working memory and solve it via cognitive brute force in a way that 
operates on DeMorgan’s Law. While there surely would be underlying processes at play 
that would rely upon built-in logical rules, there seems to be a regard in which I can make 
an inference whose processing was veridically based on DeMorgan’s Law, and not 
merely on built-in constituent rules. Something similar could be said about Cindy’s 
capacity to make a brute-force inference with the  rule. 
 It may be the case that the QDM account does not aspire to explain transitions 
like these. They acknowledge at the start of their paper that the psychological approach to 
which they subscribe to focuses attention on the “involuntary, unconscious, and perhaps 
normatively degenerate aspects of inferential transitions” (2). I readily agree that 
unconscious rational processes are important for inference, and that subjects may often be 
mistaken about the details of these processes. I argued at length in the previous section 
that subjects are often blind to the details of the causal history of an inferred conclusion. 
It strikes me as problematic, however, that the QDM account of inference seems to 
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neglect some the transitions that seem to fit most intuitively into the category in favor of 
logical transitions that are more controversially inferential.  
 
 Based on this discussion, some further virtues of a taking condition in general and 
of Taking* in particular begin to emerge. An account of inference that incorporates some 
form of a taking condition provides for a natural explanation for the individuation of 
inferences. An inference achieves its status as such because (in part) of our taking it to be 
one. Any causal transition we take to be an inference is an inference. This also makes 
clear the importance of considering a broad, commonsense category of inference. 
 Additionally, the example of Cindy highlighted again the fact that subjects are 
often blind to the premises and rules preceding our inferences. She took her belief that “3 
 8 = 46” to follow from a trustworthy internal process. The veridical nature of the 
processing that got her to that conclusion, however, is a complex issue. Taking* explains 
how Cindy could be able to make this macro-inference without any reflection on how she 
got there. This gives us reason to prefer Taking* over Boghossian’s Taking. 
 In Section 2 of this chapter, I argued that despite certain virtues of a taking 
account of inference, this taking could not plausibly involve regard for the details of the 
causal history of an inferred belief. In Section 3, I have discussed Quilty-Dunn and 
Mandelbaum’s recent account of inference, on which there is no taking condition on 
inference, but rather an inference achieves its status as such based on a particular type of 
rule-following. I argued that, like Boghossian’s Taking, the bare inferential transition 
account of inference is worse off than Taking* in explaining the target category of 




4. Cataloguing the types of inferences 
I have fixed my explanandum in this paper as commonsense inferences, very 
broadly construed; any cognitive transition resulting in a belief where a subject takes this 
new, revised, confirmed, or supposed belief to follow from a trustworthy internal process. 
Along the way, I have referred to several different types of inference that fall under the 
umbrella of this unified category. I have not yet laid out a full accounting of the 
transitions I intend to include. In the catalogue that follows, I will make clear that 
Taking* is well positioned to cover this full range. 
It is also important to note that the types of rule-following I discuss in this section 
may in fact not turn out to be discrete kinds. Some of these are likely to be combinable, 
some may be alternative explanations of the processing in a single type of rule, and some 
may be divisible into two or more subcategories. The categories of rules offered in this 
section are merely one way of demonstrating the diversity of cognitive transitions that 
must be accommodated by a full account of inference.2 
 
Deductive inferences 
First, let us consider reasoning that appears to be deductive. I say “appears to be,” 
because some may take “deductive reasoning” to necessarily involve the application of 
logical rules. That is, “deductive reasoning” might, on the one hand, refer to reasoning 
whose actual processing consists of the application of rules to infer certain logically 
guaranteed results. A broader construal of deductive reasoning, on the other hand, would 
																																																								
2 Consideration of the full diversity of types of processing that underlie inferences will also be 
essential to the second chapter of this dissertation, where I address whether a dual process model 
of reasoning is well-equipped to handle this diversity. 
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apply to any inference— regardless of the nature of the actual processing underlying it— 
that is appropriately evaluated according to a deductive standard. For example, consider 
the prompt, “Given that A, and that If A then B, what follows?” On the second, broader 
construal just mentioned, the reasoning required to infer an answer to this prompt should 
count as deductive regardless of the nature of the processing that actually underlies the 
subject’s inference. It is in this second construal of deductive reasoning that I am 
interested. This is an important distinction, as subjects do not reason through all 
deductive prompts via reliance upon deductive rules. For each of the types of deductive 
reasoning I will discuss, it is important to remember that “reasoning” ought not to have a 
success grammar built in; each of these categories admits both good and bad reasoning.  
  
Explicit reliance on deductive rules in processing (“paradigmatic deductive inferences”) 
Earlier in this chapter, I referred to the mathematician as a “paradigmatic” case of 
deductive inference. The mathematician engages in explicit deductive inference in each 
step of her proof: she considers what she has proven so far, considers the rules of 
mathematical inference she has learned, and endorses a new fact that is deductively 
supported by the combination of the previous steps and the application of the rule. 
Students taking an exam in an introductory formal logic class may also rely explicitly on 
deductive rules in each step of a proof. They also, however, might misremember a rule: 
say that they confuse the deductive rules they have learned and execute one step in their 
proof based on their mistaken belief that “affirming the consequent” is a valid rule of 
deductive inference. While they are explicitly relying on a deductive rule, they are clearly 
making a bad inference. 
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Explicit reliance on deductive rules meets both (a) and (b), and in fact it does so 
paradigmatically: a subject considers certain premise-beliefs and forms a conclusion-
belief (a) that is caused by her deliberation on her premise-beliefs (b). The subject 
explicitly relying on deductive rules meets Taking* in that she takes her conclusion to 
follow from a trustworthy internal process: namely the explicit consideration of certain 
premise-beliefs and certain deductive rules. She also meets the higher standard of 
Boghossian’s Taking, in that she takes her premise-beliefs to support her new conclusion-
belief. 
One important note about explicit reliance on deductive rules is that it is quite 
costly in terms of the burden it places on our working memory resources. It is difficult for 
us to sustain this type of paradigmatically deductive reasoning for long periods of time. 
This fact is central to Kahneman’s endorsement of a “default-interventionist” dual 
process model, on which subjects prefer to remain in a default state of “cognitive ease,” 
only firing up more demanding reasoning processes when the defaults are in some way 
inadequate (Kahneman 2011).  
I so far have intended to make no claims about the commonality or rarity of 
explicit reliance on deductive rules relative to other types of inference, deductive or 
otherwise. I have simply argued that subjects do on some occasions engage in reasoning 
that proceeds by relying on explicit deductive rules. 
 
Implicit reliance on deductive rules in processing 
 Subjects may sometimes appeal to deductive rules without explicitly considering 
them. Presented with the prompt, “Given that A, and that If A then B, what follows?” it 
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seems that I (or anyone with the requisite amount of experience with modus ponens) is 
able to answer the prompt without consciously reflecting on the rule itself. This is 
perhaps even more evident in the case of basic arithmetic. If asked to add 83 and 38, a 
subject may respond quickly and correctly. The processing underlying this inference 
might involve the following of learned deductive rules, but the response can be given 
without conscious reflection on these rules. One can also rely implicitly on deductive 
rules while making an incorrect inference. If a subject responds to the above addition 
problem as 111 rather than 121, the most natural explanation seems to be that they have 
applied a rule incorrectly— perhaps not carefully enough— rather than that they were 
relying on a means of processing other than rule-following. 
 Implicit reliance on deductive rules clearly meets (a) and (b), in that a conclusion-
belief is created as the result of a causal process. Implicit reliance and explicit reliance on 
deductive rules should not differ in this respect. Implicit reliance on deductive rules 
meets Taking* in that the subject takes the new conclusion-belief— say, the answer to an 
arithmetic problem— to follow from a trustworthy internal process. We can also grant 
Boghossian that his Taking condition to accommodate cases of implicit reasoning, though 
some potential difficulties may arise here, as discussed in section 3. 
 These comments should be relatively uncontroversial; I have not committed 
myself to any claim or generalization about the frequency with which subjects make 
inferences based on implicit application of deductive rules. Nor have I committed myself 
to the existence any categories of reasoning that are always addressed via this type of 
inference. I merely wish to suggest that this is one way in which we do sometimes make 




Associative deductive reasoning 
In general, a cognitive process is said to be associative when it operates based on 
similarity, correlation, and statistical regularity between features of the environment in a 
subjects’ experience. Associations are neither propositionally structured nor sensitive to 
logical intervention. Associative processes are contrasted with logical or rule-based 
processes, whose operation involves the manipulation of abstract logical rules or symbols 
that are propositionally structured. One very important distinction for present purposes 
between associative and rule-based inferences is that the former are relatively immune to 
self-revision in any particular reasoning task, while the latter are more easily self-revised. 
Because associations are based on statistical regularities, they are relatively rigid; they 
can only be modulated over the long term via counter-conditioning.  
The prevalence of associative reasoning has recently become a matter of 
controversy in the philosophy and psychology literature on reasoning. Some advocates of 
dual process models, most notably Steven Sloman, contend that “Type 1” processes are 
essentially and necessarily associative (1996, 2002, elsewhere). They point to examples 
like performance on the Wason selection task in order to bolster their claims that any 
reasoning process that is not essentially rule-based is associative. Eric Mandelbaum, on 
the other hand, has argued that many ostensibly associative inferences are in fact 
responsive to logical intervention, and are therefore not associative (2014). This 
argument will be taken up at greater length in Chapter 2. 
In Section 2, I discussed the associative interpretation of common incorrect 
responses to the Wason selection task. There is no need to revisit that discussion now. I 
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merely wish to note that an associative deductive inference does in fact count as an 
inference, broadly construed, and that the nature of the rules that figure into this type of 
inference are categorically different than the types of rules that figure into inferences that 
rely on learned deductive rules, for example. 
 
Probabilistic deductive reasoning 
 The possibility of probabilistic deductive reasoning was also discussed at great 
length in Section 2, in my discussion of the Oaksford and Chater interpretation of the 
common incorrect responses to the Wason selection task. Once again, we must only note 
here that such reasoning does in fact count as inference, and that the type of rule on 
which such an inference would rely is different from either associative reasoning or 
reliance on learned deductive rules. 
 
Inductive reasoning 
Explicit inductive reasoning 
 I will now turn my attention to inductive reasoning. Once again, I must make 
clear that I am interested in reasoning that appears to be appropriately held to an 
inductive standard. In Section 2, I described the case of a chemist who follows specific 
learned, inductive guidelines to generalize a new law based on repeated lab results. This 
type of inference is clearly inductive, and it is paradigmatic in the sense that the subject 
explicitly calls upon inductive rules for the generalization of chemical laws that she has 
learned. Something along the lines of “only after an experiment has been repeated x 
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number of times with y degree of similarity can a result be generalized into a scientific 
law.” 
 Just as with explicit deductive reasoning, it is likely that explicit inductive 
reasoning is largely restricted to academic contexts. There are of course exceptions: 
subjects may use learned deductive rules explicitly if calculating a percentage in a non-
academic setting using basic algebra, or a subject might apply a learned inductive 
prediction guideline when playing fantasy football. Regardless of how common or rare it 
is for subjects to apply inductive rules explicitly, it seems that they do make inferences 
along these lines on occasion. These inferences meet (a) and (b) in that a new belief 
proceeds from a causal process. These inferences also meet both Taking and Taking*, for 
similar reasons described in the section on explicit deductive reasoning.   
 
 Everyday inductive reasoning 
 I discussed some examples of everyday induction in section 3. Swimmer was such 
a case, and any number of examples of reasoning based on fallacies of weak induction 
would serve equally well. In any instance of everyday induction, a subject relies on an 
inductive rule— generalization, analogy, etc.— but these generally will not be rules they 
are able to articulate, as the fallacious cases make clear. As I have said several times, this 
rule-blindness may not be a problem for Boghossian, given a charitable reading of 
Taking, but it does seem to encourage the alternative view that a subject endorses an 
inferred conclusion because she takes that conclusion-belief to be a certain way, and not 
the causal history of that conclusion-belief. Everyday induction may rely on associations, 
it may rely on probabilistic reasoning, or it may rely on processing different from either 
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of these. Everyday inductive inferences are inferences, but they are categorically different 
from inferences relying on rules that were explicitly learned. 
 
Hypothetical reasoning 
 As I mentioned at the start of Section 2, there are certain exceptional cases in 
which inferences do not result in beliefs. When a subject reasons via supposition, she 
entertains certain premises, which she also might not believe, and considers what further 
conclusion she must also believe if she were to believe those premises. This type of 
hypothetical reasoning could be deductive or inductive, but it will necessarily be explicit. 
I view it as a subcategory of paradigmatic inference like the types that Boghossian 
considers— it is demanding on our working memory. Unlike many types of inference, it 
seems more likely that hypothetical inference requires some logical sophistication. A 
subject likely must have at least some concepts about arguments and logic in order to 
make a hypothetical inference. In Section 5, I will argue that these exceptional cases are 
naturally included under my picture of inference, as they yield the assent affect despite 
the fact that the subject will not believe the conclusion.   
 
 5. Taking* 
 On my account, a subject makes an inference if and only if she meets these 3 
criteria: 
(a) the transition results in a new, revised, or reaffirmed belief 
(b) this belief is caused by some prior states or events 
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(c) Taking*: A cognitive transition resulting in a conclusion-belief 
qualifies as an inference if the subject takes the conclusion-belief to 
follow from a trustworthy internal process. 
 
In this section, I will flesh out Taking* in much greater detail. I will explain what it is for 
a subject to take a conclusion belief to follow from (or be the output of) a trustworthy 
internal process. I will argue that the relevant form of Taking* is intuitional—it involves 
a metacognitive intuition, and that this intuition carries the feeling of correctness, or the 
assent affect.  
Boghossian considers a few possibilities for how his Taking condition might be 
construed. Although his Taking is different than my Taking*, in that his version requires 
a subject to take her premises to support her conclusion, the construals he considers are 
still instructive in developing how we should understand Taking* and its intentional 
contents. 
The first possibility that Boghossian considers is that the Taking* condition might 
involve a meta-cognitive belief about the relationship between premise-beliefs and 
conclusion-belief (6). On this first such construal he considers, the “full-fledged 
normative doxastic construal,” the Taking condition is met when a subject has a belief 
along the lines “My judging (1) and (2) supports my judging (3) (ibid). Boghossian 
rejects this construal for two reasons: first, it is the presumed truth of 1 that motivates the 
subjects metacognitive judgment (Taking), not the fact that she judges (1) to be true. 
Second, and more germane to my concerns in this chapter, Boghossian worries that a 
normative metacognitive belief along these sides is not plausible for most ordinary 
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thinkers. It is implausible that children, or even many non-philosopher adults, have 
metacognitive beliefs about the relations between their premises and conclusions (7).  
Boghossian moves on to consider a different doxastic construal of Taking, on 
which the subject merely forms a “meta-propositional” belief, e.g. the belief that (3) 
follows from (1) and (2) (ibid). This type of metacognitive belief would avoid the first 
problem that the normative meta-belief discussed above faced, in that a subject is not 
required to judge a conclusion true in virtue of judgments (rather than truth). The meta-
propositional belief will, however, succumb to the second concern above, i.e. that it 
requires subjects to have more sophisticated concepts of rationality than seem plausible in 
all human thinkers. 
After rejecting these doxastic construals of taking, and others whose consideration 
is less relevant to our present consideration of Taking*, Boghossian considers an 
intuitional construal (8). I believe that an intuitional construal is the best explanation of 
Taking*, with intuition understood as “intellectual seeming.” While Boghossian is 
agnostic about whether it carries a distinctive phenomenology, I will argue that this 
intuitional state that underlies Taking* is accompanied by the assent affect— the feeling 
of correctness. Boghossian argues that an intuitional construal is better able than a 
doxastic construal to survive some of his concerns, in part because “an intuition, like a 
perception, is not subject to epistemic assessment— it is beyond justification” (9). He 
ultimately worries that an intuition will not be able to non-circularly explain how a 
subject is justified in performing an inference. As discussed in Section 3 of this chapter, 
however, my ambitions are descriptive and naturalistic, rather than normative and 
epistemological. Like the Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum account, I am interested in what 
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property of inferences distinguishes them from other types of cognitive transitions, and 
not in the conferral of justification from premise to conclusion. Boghossian’s worry about 
an intuitional basis of a taking condition does not apply to my ambitions with Taking*. 
Where X is the content of a conclusion-belief, I hold that Taking* involves an 
intuition like this:  
[I intuit that] X is true because it follows from a trustworthy internal process. 
 
When a subject infers X, she has an intuition with this intentional content. As discussed at 
length in the foregoing sections of this chapter, she need not regard her premises or the 
details of the causal history of her inferred conclusion belief at all.  
 In designating the attitude underlying Taking* as an intuition rather than a belief, 
I wish to make the requirements on thinkers as spare as I can. As the examples in the 
previous section of this chapter made clear, subjects very often make commonsense 
inferences without any awareness of the details of the inferred conclusion’s causal 
history. If Taking* involves an intuition of this type, then these considerations about 
premise- and rule-blindness are fully accommodated. I also hold that this intuition carries 
a distinct phenomenology— the feeling of correctness, or the assent affect— which I will 
discuss at greater length shortly. 
First, let us consider the intentional content of this intuition in a bit more detail. 
Note that, on my view, subjects need not have any of the sophisticated meta-cognitive 
concepts that worried Boghossian as he evaluated doxastic underpinnings of his Taking 
condition. I believe that the requisite concepts that figure in the intentional content of the 
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intuition—that conclusion-belief X follows from a trustworthy internal process— are 
available in a wide variety of reasoners, including children. 
The intentional content of the intuition requires that subjects understand 
themselves to have at least one “internal process” that produces ideas. I wish to 
characterize this conception in the most general way, without committing myself to any 
particular account of self-knowledge or theory of mind. Rather, on my view, any being 
that is capable of self-ascribing an idea (as opposed to, say, a perception) understands that 
some mental events exist thanks to internal mental processes. If a subject can muster the 
thought, “this idea came from me,” they have the relevant concept of an internal process. 
They also understand the relevant sense of “follows from”— it seems to them that the 
conclusion-belief (which they need not conceive of us a belief in robust terms) came 
about because of something they did. The conclusion is their conclusion, or so it seems to 
them, even in the absence of what the inferential effort, i.e. the details of the causal 
history of the conclusion-belief, consisted of. 
The requirement that subjects take the belief to follow from an internal process 
does some particular work here. In contemporary epistemology, some accounts hold that 
perceptual experiences hold immediate justification in virtue of carrying a particular type 
of phenomenal force. This view is known as dogmatism, or perceptual dogmatism (Pryor, 
Huemer). First, I hold that there is a distinctive phenomenology associated with 
inference, and with the Taking* intuition. I am doubtful that the phenomenology in virtue 
of which perceptual experiences may be justified is indistinguishable from the assent 
affect. Moreover, on my view, the Taking* intuition involves the subject ascribing a 
conclusion-belief to an internal process. It is critical to a belief’s status as inferred that 
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the subject takes it to follow from an internal process. Since subjects do not take 
perceptual experiences to follow from an internal process, there is no risk of perceptual 
experiences being construed as inferred by the dogmatist’s lights. 
Additionally, subjects must intuit that the internal process from which the 
conclusion followed is trustworthy. Intuiting that a process is trustworthy means that it 
seems trustworthy to them; they are tempted to accept the truth of the belief. Ernest Sosa 
has characterized intuition as a temptation or disposition to believe (1998). It must seem 
to the subject that they are disposed to accept the truth of the conclusion because of the 
nature of the internal process from which the conclusion followed. Very importantly, they 
need not have any regard for the particular premises or the rules that figured into the 
causal history of that process, nor even any particular idea about what facts about the 
internal process made it trustworthy. They merely must intuit that they assent to the truth 
of the conclusion because the internal process was a process that seems to produce true 
conclusions. 
 
6. The assent affect 
As discussed previously in his chapter, my account holds that this intuition has a 
distinctive phenomenology, namely the feeling of correctness, which I am calling the 
assent affect. I think that this phenomenology is important: subjects are likely to say that 
a conclusion “felt right” as they are to say that it “seemed right”— they are not inclined 
to make a commonsense distinction between the phenomenology and the intuition. The 
assent affect is an intellectual feeling that accompanies a conclusion-belief; it is the 
feeling that the conclusion-belief has followed from a trustworthy internal process. I view 
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the intuitional state and the assent affect as fully coextensive: the intellectual seeming as 
outlined in the previous section consists in the manifestation of the feeling of correctness 
that accompanies a conclusion-belief. When a conclusion-belief is accompanied by the 
assent affect, the subject is in the correct intuitional state. 
Defining inference in terms of seeming and feeling accommodates the widespread 
existence of bad inferences and inferences where the subject is correct but is nonetheless 
ignorant of or blind to the details causal history of a conclusion-belief. All that matters, 
on this account, is that a conclusion-belief is accompanied by this seeming or feeling; it is 
in virtue of this feeling of rightness— this intuition and feeling that the belief has 
followed from a trustworthy internal process— that a subject endorses the conclusion-
belief. In the previous section, we examined cases of fallacious inductive inferences. In 
these cases, subjects formed an irrational conclusion-belief based on certain premise-
beliefs, and the only type of explanation they had for the endorsement of their 
conclusion-belief was the intuition or feeling that this conclusion-belief is a good 
conclusion. 
In cases like those of associative or probabilistic reasoning, subjects are not aware 
of the reasons in virtue of which they inferred their conclusion, even if their inference is 
good. An account of inference on which their “taking” is meant to do any explanatory 
work in terms of the actual justificatory reasons for endorsing their conclusion is useless 
in these cases. The fact of their taking the conclusion to follow is irrelevant to the type of 
processing on which their inference relied. This shift is necessary to accommodate the 
full diversity of good and bad inferences. 
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I do not take myself to be committed to the conclusion that all types of inference 
will enjoy identical phenomenology. Especially in cases of explicit reasoning, different 
phenomenology might accompany deductive versus inductive inferences. I merely hold 
that phenomenology accompanying all inferences have something minimal in common: 
the assent affect, or the feeling of correctness.  
We are now able to say something about the types of being to which this account 
of inference can be extended. If a being is capable of achieving a conclusion-belief whose 
propositional content is targeted by the Taking* intuitional state, which involves the 
phenomenology of correctness, then that being is capable of inference. It seems like that 
human children are fully capable of making a wide range of inferences on this view, 
which I take to be a virtue. The view is extendable to non-human animals to the extent 
that those animals are capable of manifesting the Taking* intuitional state and the assent 
affect. I do not wish to take any hard stance on this issue, but I argued in the previous 
section that any being capable of simple belief self-ascription is likely capable of 
manifesting the Taking* intuition, and so I believe that those species which are more 
successful in self-knowledge tests are likely capable of inference as well. 
I have argued that the Taking* intuition involves a particular phenomenology—
what it is for a conclusion belief to seem to have followed form a trustworthy internal 
process is for it to feel a certain way. But what if a thinker were capable of a similarly 
structured intuition with similar intentional content, but it were not capable of 
manifesting the relevant phenomenology? I am willing to bite the bullet that this being is 
incapable of inference. Consider Watson, the IBM question-answering computer that beat 
the two most successful champions in the history of the television show Jeopardy! 
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Watson operates on a probabilistic, Bayesian search algorithm (Yuan). Based on the 
words in the clue entered into Watson’s database, Watson searches its vast storage of 
literary and reference materials for frequently associated ideas, and comes up with 
several possible solutions, to which Watson attaches percentile degrees of confidence. If 
Watson’s confidence in one response meets a certain threshold, Watson will “buzz” in 
and offer its answer. Charitably, Watson’s confidence-based judgments could be 
described as a type of intuition— it seems to Watson that its conclusion is based on 
trustworthy internal processes. But Watson does not, of course, experience the 
phenomenology of correctness. It strikes me as no great loss to say that Watson reaches 
its answer by means of conjecture, not inference, unlike the human who experiences the 
assent affect. 
One might alternatively object that my account allows for radical misfires of the 
assent affect to qualify as inferences. Consider, for example, someone who suffers brain 
damage such that she produces the Taking* intuition and the assent affect every time she 
smells popcorn. In each instance of popcorn odor, she will undergo a causal cognitive 
transition, the output of which will be a belief, whose contents is targeted by the Taking* 
intuition, which is accompanied by the assent affect. I would say that this subject is 
afflicted in such a way that she makes an enormous number of terrible inferences. I do 
not think this subject is so far off from someone who has not suffered any acute brain 
damage, and yet still makes bad inferences. Imagine someone who infers, with regularity, 
the negation of the correct conclusion in every case. I am inclined to say that both of 
these cases are extreme versions of bad thinkers we have all encountered. The cause or 
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consistency of someone’s bad inferences is not reason to doubt their thoughts’ status as 
inferences. 
Hypothetical reasoning also involves atypical firing of the assent affect. In cases 
of supposition, subjects make inferences without actually believing the conclusion. As 
discussed in the previous section, subjects who entertain what might follow from 
premises they do not actually believe can still infer from these premises. This type of 
supposition counts as an inference even though the subject will not indorse the 
hypothetical conclusion, by my lights, because the hypothetical conclusion is still 
accompanied by the assent affect.  
 
The assent affect figures critically into the later chapters of this dissertation, and 
so I ought to flesh it out a bit more. Ronald de Sousa has written extensively on the role 
that emotions play in rationality. De Sousa argues that the role emotions play in 
reasoning should not be downplayed. He takes very seriously what Daniel Kahneman has 
called “the pleasure of cognitive ease” (Kahneman 2011; De Sousa 2013). Kahneman 
describes studies in which subjects tend to answer prompts incorrectly in order to avoid 
using more cognitive effort than might be necessary. For example, in one study, subjects 
who were exposed to the phrase “the body temperature of a chicken” were much more 
likely to assent to the proposition “the body temperature of a chicken is 144 degrees” or 
any other arbitrary number at a later stage of the experiment (Kahneman 2011, 62). The 
“familiarity bias” of the certain phrases was enough to cause subjects to assent to 
propositions that should have been obviously false. Kahneman argues that remaining in a 
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state of “cognitive ease”— not calling upon more effortful reasoning resources— 
involves a type of pleasure, in which subjects prefer to remain.  
Studies such as this, De Sousa holds, demonstrate that “affective phenomena [are] 
essentially involved in the pursuit of epistemic aims” (de Sousa 16). He focuses on a 
range of states that he refers to as “epistemic feelings,” and identifies four in particular:  
“Wonder motivates inquiry, but presupposes no specific prior belief, and need not 
target any existing supposition. […]Doubt also motivates inquiry but bears on 
hypotheses already entertained. […] Certainty bears on specific beliefs; it is, in a 
sense, antithetical to inquiry, in that it freezes any further quest for evidence or 
argument. On the other hand, it frees us for action by stamping certain facts or 
values as appropriate ones to be acting upon. The feeling of rightness seems to 
belong in the same general category. […]The Feeling of Knowing bears on 
specific propositions, but is unable to specify them: it is a kind of indication that it 
is worth the time and effort to keep trying to recall something that is in fact 
‘somewhere in my head.’” (de Sousa 16-17, emphasis his) 
 
De Sousa believes that the types of cases Kahneman mentions make clear that epistemic 
feelings like these are required for reasoning, but he does not make any claim about how 
they fit into dual processes, and seems to preserve his neutrality with respect to those 
further questions. He claims that these “specific epistemic feelings […] have very 
specific roles, either in stamping a kind of seal of approval on the steps of an argument or 
the conclusion of an inference, or, on the contrary in spurring further inquiry” (De Sousa 
17). 
 It is worth noting briefly here that De Sousa’s conception of the relationship 
between doubt and cognitive ease was preceded by C.S. Peirce’s similar account. In the 
“Fixation of Belief” (1877), Peirce wrote, “Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from 
which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief; while the latter is a 
calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid, or to change to a belief in 
anything else.” (Section III). This Peircian view of doubt has much in common with my 
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view, on which Type 2 intervention is triggered by intellectual emotions like doubt or the 
absence of cognitive ease.  
I believe that De Sousa is on the right track with his cataloging of epistemic 
feelings, but he does seem to undersell the importance of the “feeling of rightness,” 
which I am calling the assent affect. The assent affect is an epistemic feeling— an 
attitude which causes the subject to endorse certain beliefs. In other words, in the causal 
chain of inference, certain premise-beliefs trigger a certain type of processing— perhaps 
rule-based, associative, or probabilistic; perhaps consciously available to the subject or 
unavailable. The processing causes a new belief to appear. This new belief may or may 
not be targeted by the assent affect, the metacognitive epistemic feeling; if the new belief 
is targeted (or accompanied) by the assent affect, the subject endorses the belief and the 
cognitive transition counts as an inference.  
In many cases— especially in the vast majority of everyday inferences in which 
the subject is not reasoning in a deliberate, effortful way with explicit regard for learned 
inference rules— the assent affect seems to play an essential role in allowing us to remain 
in a state of cognitive ease, along the lines that Kahneman describes. The assent affect 
seems to be the vessel through which a number of biases and heuristics affect our human 

















Over the past few decades, dual process models of cognition have become 
prominent in philosophy and psychology. Such theories contend that human reasoning 
may occur in one of two distinct ways: Type 1 reasoning processes are fast, associative, 
automatic, and effortless; Type 2 reasoning processes are slow, rule-based, deliberate, 
and effortful. The dual process distinction has been defended using empirical follows 
from a number of psychological domains, and it has enjoyed significant endorsement 
from philosophers. The proposed dichotomy within reasoning has given philosophers a 
new tool with which to navigate traditional questions, including those related to moral 
reasoning (Greene, Saunders) and belief ascription (Apperly & Butterfill, Goldman). 
Theoretical problems become easier to solve when not all reasoning must be 
accommodated under a single umbrella. 
Unfortunately, the eagerness with which dual process models have been applied 
has outpaced the clarity of the distinction itself. Despite the popularity and prominence of 
dual process models in recent psychology and philosophy, significant and substantive 
questions remain about what the distinction is really claiming and whether it holds up to 
scrutiny. It is my goal in this chapter and the following to present a novel dual process 
account that accommodates psychological evidence and philosophical considerations. A 
preliminary step (very often neglected in the foregoing literature) to a coherent dual 
process account is to be very clear about the category of cognitive events over which we 
are quantifying when we claim that reasoning can be dichotomized. My goal in the first 
chapter of this thesis was to establish such parameters. I presented inference, taken to be 
48 
	
belief-producing cognitive transitions, as the relevant category, and I argued that an 
inference occurs when a causal cognitive transition follows in a belief accompanied by 
the assent affect, or a feeling of correctness. The assent affect will figure centrally into 
the dual process account I offer in this chapter. 
I will argue that there are three criteria a dual process model must meet, and I will 
discuss two of these in the present chapter. The most natural question to ask about dual 
process models is about which qualitative features are fundamental to each type of 
processing rather than merely typical. I will hold that a theory is sufficiently explanatory 
only if it explains something about the unique nature of each type of processing; how 
does each process handle information differently? What is the nature of the reasoning 
performed by these two processes, such that they are not merely duplicating 
functionality? I will refer to this as the fundamentality criterion.  
The final, third chapter of my thesis is devoted to the fundamentality criterion. 
Before I can address fundamentality, however, I must first paint a clear picture of what 
these two processes look like when they are in operation, and why anyone might think we 
have two reasoning processes in the first place. 
I begin by exposing a variety of psychological cases that motivate the dual 
process distinction. Based on these cases, I argue that a dual process model should offer a 
coherent explanation of the structure of the relationship between the two types of 
process: do they run in parallel, sequentially, or in some other way? Closely related to 
structure, a dual process account should explain specific triggering conditions for Type 2 
processes to engage with a certain task.  
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I offer a dual process account that meets these three criteria. In this chapter, I 
address the structure and triggering criteria; I address fundamenality in the following. I 
agree with the recent work of Kahneman, Evans, and Stanovich in arguing for a default-
interventionist processing structure. According to a default-interventionist schema, 
subjects typically rely on Type 1 default processes— in a state that Kahneman calls 
“cognitive ease”— unless the greater accuracy of Type 2 processing is demanded. 
Previous default-interventionist accounts are silent, however, on the crucial question of 
triggering: in virtue of what is Type 2 intervention triggered or not triggered? I argue that 
the assent affect— or more correctly its absence— is an excellent candidate to play this 
triggering role. I argue that these proto-emotions play the role of “rational traffic cops”; 
they determine when our fast, sloppy Type 1 is sufficient and when our careful, effortful 
Type 2 must intervene, thereby preserving a parsimonious and efficient reasoning 
schema. I spell out a full account of the metaphysics of the assent affect and the 
functional role these proto-emotions play. 
I will not address fundamentality until the next chapter. There, I will argue that 
Type 2 inferences involve the manipulation of self-revisable rules, while Type 1 
inferences do not involve such rules. For the sake of clarity, it is worth noting now that I 
follow an emerging orthodoxy in holding that Type 1 processing corresponds to a set of 
autonomous, domain-specific processing modules, while Type 2 reasoning corresponds 
to a single, flexible, domain-general processing system (Stanovich 2004, 2011; Evans and 
Stanovich 2013). For that reason, Type 2 inferences are united by a fundamental 
explanation (i.e., self-revisable rules), and Type 1 inferences are defined in opposition. 
These issues will be discussed at length in Chapter 3; Chapter 2 is devoted to laying out a 
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plausible picture of how dual processes might cooperate: how are they structured, and 
how is Type 2 triggered? 




Philosophical interest of dual process models 
The dual process distinction holds philosophical interest both for intrinsic reasons 
and because of its applicability to a variety of philosophical problems. Historically, 
philosophers dichotomized mental activity long before empirical evidence for the 
distinction began to emerge: William James claimed we are capable of two types of 
thinking: “empirical thinking” is “only reproductive,” consisting of elements and 
abstractions from past experience and appearing to the subject as “trains of images 
suggested one by another” (James 1890/1950, 325). James distinguishes empirical 
thinking from “genuine thinking,” which is “productive,” in that it can handle new types 
of experiences. Norman Malcolm more recently drew a distinction between “thinking” 
and “having thoughts,” where “having the thought that p” refers to a subject’s explicitly 
formulating and entertaining the proposition p, and “thinking that p” is a more primitive 
state that does not require the subject to formulate or entertain the proposition p (1973).  
Though neither James nor Malcom’s distinctions map neatly onto the modern 
dual process hypothesis, their accounts are informative in at least one way. Both James 
and Malcolm define each of their types of thought in terms of the nature of its processing. 
That is, their accounts tell us something about how each type of thought handles 
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information differently than its counterpart. Their accounts meet what I am calling the 
fundamentality criterion. 
Many contemporary philosophical dual process accounts have focused on 
domain-specific reasoning. That is, they have taken the generic dual process distinction 
and applied it to philosophical questions within moral reasoning (Greene, Haidt, 
Saunders) and belief ascription, both third- and first-personal (Apperly & Butterfill, 
Goldman). I believe that the dual process model has been applied to these domain-
specific philosophical problems even while substantial questions remain about how such 
a model might work. It is my intention in this chapter and the following to provide a 
philosophically coherent generic dual process model, which could be applied to these and 
potentially other domains. 
 
2. Motivating cases 
 Most generic dual process models share a common set of motivating cases, 
namely, cases in which subjects seem to simultaneously possess two conflicting or 
contradictory beliefs. One such case is the Wason selection task, in the domain of 
deductive reasoning (Evans 1977 and many subsequent sources). I discussed the Wason 
case in the previous chapter, and I will briefly reiterate that here. In one version of this 
test, subjects were shown four cards on a table, each of which they were told had a color 
on one side and a number on the other: solid red, solid brown, the number 3, and the 
number 8. Subjects were then asked which card or cards they must turn over to test the 
truth of the proposition, “If a card shows an even number on one side, then it must be red 
on the opposite side.” This proposition can only be invalidated by a card that has an even 
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number on one side but is not red on the other, so the 8 and the brown card should be 
turned. Fewer than ten percent of subjects succeed in this task; most subjects responded 
that the 8 and the red card should be turned. Evans hypothesizes that this common false 
response is produced by a primitive matching bias, a Type 1 process in modern 
terminology: “red” and “even” are named explicitly in the prompt. When the correct 
answer is explained to them in terms of the rules of logic, i.e. a Type 2 process, many 
subjects can see that it is correct, but continue to feel the “pull” of their original, incorrect 
belief. In these cases, subjects simultaneously believe that the correct answer is true and 
that the incorrect answer is true. The outputs of their Type 1 and Type 2 processes, in 
other words, contradict each other. 
 Another motivating case, from the domain of social reasoning, emerges from 
implicit association tests, which claim to demonstrate contradictions between a subject’s 
stated and implicit beliefs. One prominent example evaluates racial stereotypes: subjects 
are first asked to evaluate a set of statements about their preferences for certain races over 
others— most subjects “disagree” with the racist propositions. In the test itself, subjects 
are shown a series that includes words and faces and are asked to categorize each. First, 
subjects are asked to categorize the words or faces as, e.g. “European-American [faces] 
or Bad [words]” versus “African-American or Good.” Then, subjects are shown the same 
series of words or faces, except the categories change to “European-American or Good” 
versus “African-American or Bad.” Many European-American subjects demonstrate 
much slower reaction times in the first portion of the test, suggesting that they have 
strong associations between positive words and their own race and between negative 
words and a different race. These results are often interpreted as demonstrating the 
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simultaneous presence of contradictory beliefs: Type 2 processes output explicit beliefs 
that races are equal in subjects’ eyes, while Type 1 processes output implicit beliefs 
corresponding to subjects’ racial preferences. 
 Apparent conflicts between the two reasoning processes can emerge even in cases 
dealing with explicit argument examination. Sloman, for example, presented subjects 
with the proposition, “All birds have an ulnar artery.” He asked subjects to rate several 
conclusions based on how convincing they found these inferences. Sloman found that 
subjects (even those with statistical training) rated the conclusion, “Therefore, all robins 
have an ulnar artery” as far more convincing (9.6 out of 10) than the conclusion, 
“Therefore, all penguins have an ulnar artery” (6.4 out of 10) (Sloman 1996, 12). 
Obviously, any subject with a grasp on the relevant concepts should rate these two 
conclusions as equally plausible. Sloman interprets these results as revealing dual 
processes: many subjects will have a Type 1 judgment that penguins are less likely to 
have a general feature of birds than robins are, but this judgment will be overruled by a 
Type 2 judgment about the logic of the prompts in subjects who engage in Type 2 
processing. 
 The cases of the Wason selection task, the implicit racial bias tests, and Sloman’s 
logic tests are a few of the cases most commonly cited as evidence for dual reasoning 
processes. The presence of contradictory judgments in these examples motivates dual 
process accounts in that each judgment is thought to be the output of one or the other 
system. Due to the potential for conflict between them, the two processes are commonly 




3. The structure criterion 
The adjudication of the competition discussed in the previous section has 
generally been taken to be a significant explanatory burden for dual process models. 
While cases in which beliefs compete with or contradict each other are interesting and 
informative, my account emerges partly from the observation that these examples are a 
limited subset of reasoning cases. In many standard cases— perhaps even most of our 
mental lives— the two types of reasoning do not (as a matter of fact) output different or 
contradictory beliefs when presented with the same problem or information. There are 
cases in which the use of only one process allows us to successfully reason through a 
problem, and there are cases when the two processes are both employed and one 
“confirms” the judgment of the other. The dual process literature, I believe, has come to 
focus its attention on one limited set of cases in which the central phenomenon is 
employed.  
I believe that a dual process model should be concerned with the full range 
of reasoning cases. I can see five types of reasoning cases that would require explanation 
on a dual process model. It is possible that one or more of these cases is not plausible, but 
a successful account ought to explain why not.  
i. Type 1 process engages. Type 2 process does not engage. 
ii. Type 1 process engages. Type 2 process engages. The judgments output by each 
process are aligned. 
iii. Type 1 process engages. Type 2 process engages. The judgments output by each 
are not aligned; Type 2 judgment controls behavior. 
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iv. Type 1 process engages. Type 2 process engages. The judgments output by each 
are not aligned; Type 1 judgment controls behavior. 
v. Type 2 process engages. Type 1 process does not engage. 
 
Accounts are broken down into three general categories in terms of their structure: 
preemptive, parallel-competitive, and default-interventionist. In this section, I will argue 
that preemptive models cannot accommodate cases ii., iii., and iv., in which both 
processes simultaneously engage, and I will argue that parallel-competitive models 
cannot accommodate cases i. or v., in which only one process engages. I will argue that 
only the default-interventionist paradigm is capable of handling cases where either one or 
both processes engage, although existing default-interventionist accounts have trouble 
with cases iv. and v. In a later section, I will present a default-interventionist view 
capable of handling each of these five cases. 
 
Preemptive conflict resolution models 
 Some dual process accounts, such as Klaczynski (2000), hold that there is early 
separation of processing between the two systems. That is, certain superficial aspects of 
the stimulus or problem at hand trigger either a Type 1 or Type 2 process. For example, 
when evaluating deductive arguments, one might use Type 1 reasoning to evaluate 
arguments whose conclusion is superficially “believable”— compatible with the subject’s 
set of existing beliefs— and only trigger Type 2 reasoning to evaluate arguments whose 
conclusions one finds surprising. That is, one is more likely to invoke effortful Type 2 
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processes to scrutinize arguments for conclusions one disagrees with. This type of 
account has been referred to as the “preemptive conflict resolution” model.  
As seen in the previous section, the dual process hypothesis tends to be motivated 
by cases in which a subject entertains conflicting attitudes. It is unclear how a model 
according to which conflicts are resolved preemptively could account for cases like the 
Wason selection task where a subject simultaneously entertains conflicting beliefs.  
Even if this type of model is relaxed to allow that two different types of 
superficial stimuli could simultaneously trigger the two different types of processes, the 
theory still owes us an account for how the conflicting outputs of these two processes 
would be adjudicated. The preemptive conflict resolution model is inadequate to explain 
case ii., as well as cases iii. and iv., which are the competition cases that motivate the 
dual process hypothesis.  
 
Parallel-competitive conflict resolution models 
 The problem with the preemptive conflict resolution model is that it does not 
allow for both processes to ever be simultaneously applied. “Parallel-competitive” 
conflict resolution models hold that both processes simultaneously engage in every 
instance of reasoning. These models hold that the types of reasoning process engage in 
parallel, proposing responses to reasoning tasks. If the responses of the two processes are 
different, this conflict must be resolved after both processes have run. One very 
prominent account along these lines comes from Sloman (1996, 2002). Sloman holds that 
the distinguishing factor between the two types of reasoning is that Type 1 tends to 
involve “associative” reasoning, while Type 2 tends to involve “rule-based” reasoning. It 
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is worth briefly mentioning here that Sloman’s associative vs. rule-based characterization 
of the dual process distinction meets the fundamentality criterion in that it characterizes 
the nature of each type of process. I will discuss this distinction at greater length in the 
third chapter of this dissertation, which is devoted to the fundamentality criterion. 
 For present discussion of the structure of various dual process models, it is 
important only that Sloman’s associative system corresponds to Type 1 reasoning and 
that his rule-based system corresponds to Type 2 reasoning.3 In his dual process account, 
Sloman makes very clear that he supports a parallel processing model: 
 Both systems seem to try, at least most of the time, to generate a response. The  
rule-based system can suppress the response of the associative system in the sense 
that it can overrule it. However, the associative system always has its opinion 
heard and, because of its speed and efficiency, often precedes and neutralizes the 
rule-based response. (2002, 391) 
 
This model is conventionally parallel-competitive in that both processes reason through a 
problem independently first, and then the dispute must be adjudicated. In other words, 
every time one is presented with a reasoning problem, both processes must engage.  
 Consider the Wason selection task, in which most subjects reach an incorrect 
answer very quickly via Type 1 reasoning. It does not seem likely that Type 2 reasoning 
has begun to simultaneously engage in cases like this. Sloman, or someone with a model 
like his, would be forced to argue that a deliberate Type 2 process was already engaged 
with the task, but was aborted as soon as the Type 1 judgment was output. After subjects’ 
attention is redirected towards the logical features of the prompt, the parallel-competitive 
																																																								
3 Sloman’s use of “system” rather than “type” or “process” is meant to signal his further claim 
that the dual process hypothesis obtains at a deeper level of cognitive architecture (although these 
terms are not used consistently throughout the literature). That is, Sloman holds that each type of 
processing refers to natural kinds within cognitive activity. I stick with the weaker “dual process” 
nomenclature, as I intend my account to be in dialogue with a broad range of previous work 
covering an array of claims about connection to deeper cognitive architecture.  
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model is forced to say that they are now reengaging Type 2 processes, rather than 
engaging them for the first time. 
 In many simple reasoning tasks, it seems most plausible that Type 2 does not 
engage at all. Imagine playing a simple matching game on your smartphone on your 
subway commute home: your thoughts are elsewhere, but you are able to perform Type 1 
tasks more or less effectively. That is to say, case i. above describes a real phenomenon. 
If Type 2 processes are not engaged in this case, why are they not? The parallel-
competitive paradigm offers no natural explanation for any cases in which Type 2 does 
not engage in a reasoning task. It does not help to allow that there are some cases in 
which Type 2 does not engage; we are then left without an explanation for what does or 
does not trigger this engagement. 
 It may not be obvious at first pass whether cases like v., where there is no Type 1 
default and Type 2 judgments response immediately to a prompt, actually exist. Consider, 
though, reading a question on a math or logic test. In these cases, I generally do not have 
a “default” intuition, but rather I immediately input the prompt into my Type 2 processes 
and begin hypothesizing the applications of various rules of math or logic. The parallel-
competitive model is inept at explaining this type of case as well; we have no explanation 
for why Type 1 would not engage in these cases. 
 While the preemptive paradigm does not easily accommodate cases where both 
processes engage, the parallel-competitive paradigm does not easily accommodate cases 
in which only one process engages. 
 
Default-interventionist conflict resolution models 
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 The third category of dual process models holds that most of our reasoning 
processes occur via Type 1 processes running as a default in the background, with Type 2 
processes occasionally intervening. This is called the default-interventionist paradigm.  
According to Evans (2009), the defining feature of Type 2 processing is that it 
requires the resources of working memory. The recent account endorsed by Evans & 
Stanovich (2013) maintains this claim and extends the view by claiming that Type 2 
reasoning is demanding on working memory because it necessarily involves “cognitive 
decoupling.” This refers to the formation of a mental copy of a representation, in order to 
allow for hypothetical manipulation. Trying to solve a logic proof, for example, one may 
imagine several possible next steps, but must do so by forming a copy of the original 
mental representation of the proof’s premises and goal, so that the original representation 
is not lost due to the hypothetical manipulation. Correspondingly, the defining feature of 
Type 1 processes for Evans and Stanovich is that, “They do not require ‘controlled 
attention,’ which is another way of saying that they make minimal demands on working 
memory resources” (2013, 236). 
Both Evans (2009) and Evans & Stanovich (2013) agree that Type 2 processing is 
costly in terms of cognitive resources. Only in cases where Type 1 default processes are 
unable to reach a satisfying judgment do Type 2 processes step in to settle the issue. The 
default-interventionist paradigm is parsimonious: if one believes that we have evolved to 
use our cognitive resources economically, this type of model should hold substantial 
appeal. When the relatively modest demands of Type 1 processing are sufficient, Type 2 
is not involved. When Type 1 processes are insufficient to reach a satisfying judgment, 
our Type 2 processes are recruited to help get the job done.  
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The basic default interventionist paradigm seems to be able to explain the 
reasoning cases that the previous two paradigms could not. The preemptive conflict 
resolution model could not explain any cases in which both processes engage; the 
default-interventionist holds that these are cases in which Type 2 intervenes on Type 1 
defaults. The parallel-competitive model could not explain cases in which only Type 1 
was engaged; the default-interventionist holds that these are cases in which Type 2 
simply does not intervene. Because it can explain many cases in which either one or both 
processes are engaged, and because of the force of its arguments with respect to cognitive 
economy, default-interventionism seems the strongest available paradigm. 
Existing default–interventionist models, however, cannot naturally explain cases 
like iv. or v. We have already discussed case v., where only Type 2 engages, such as 
when taking a math or logic exam. Cases like iv., where Type 1 outputs “beat out” Type 
2 outputs for control of behavior, also seem to exist; in certain types of reasoning, we 
might describe such cases as weakness of will. In particular, when engaged in decision-
making, we might feel the immediate pull of some certain decision that is unhealthy or 
unwise. We may reflect on the choice, via Type 2 processing, and think of several 
reasons to choose a healthier option, and yet the Type 1 impulse wins out anyway. 
Standard forms of default-interventionism cannot easily accommodate these cases: if 
Type 2 has intervened, how can the default win out anyway? That outcome is not 
precluded by the structure of the model, but there is no explanation for how it could occur 
either. The form of default-interventionism I offer will be able to accommodate both 
cases iv. and v. 
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Another problem with existing default-interventionist accounts is that they have 
no adequate explanation for what specifically triggers Type 2 intervention— this is one 
of the criteria I established for dual process models. I will presently explain the 
importance of including a triggering mechanism in a default-interventionist model, and 
demonstrate that Evans and Stanovich fail to do so. I will offer a positive account of 
default-interventionist triggering in a later section. 
 
The importance of the triggering criterion 
Examining views like Kahneman’s, or Evans’ and Stanovich’s, we might ask 
what, specifically, triggers the intervention of Type 2 processes— when is it 
inappropriate to substitute simpler attributes? When is the judgment output by Type 1 
insufficiently satisfying? Evans and Stanovich claim that Type 2 processing is invoked 
“when a decision matters[…] for example, when we are evaluating important risks,” 
giving the example of a threat to one’s children (237). But what determines whether a 
decision is important? As best I can tell, Evans and Stanovich do not provide an answer 
to this question. First of all, a threat to one’s children seems like a strange example of a 
case when Type 2 processes are likely to be invoked. If a mother sees a snarling, 
unleashed dog near the playground where her children are playing, for example, one 
would think that she is likely to act quickly upon a Type 1 judgment that there is a threat, 
perhaps by ushering her children towards the car or reprimanding the dog’s owner.  
Putting this example aside, let us consider the Wason selection task, a more 
typical dual process case. Suppose a subject is given the prompt and immediately reaches 
a Type 1 judgment that he ought to flip two particular cards. Some factor then triggers his 
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Type 2 reasoning: he rereads the prompt, reflects on his understanding of the material 
conditional, and responds to the question. Importantly, the input into his Type 2 process 
would not be the output of his Type 1 judgment; one would not begin explicitly 
deliberating on the task by thinking about one’s previous incorrect answer. Rather, Type 
2 reasoning shares an input with Type 1 reasoning: the prompt itself. Furthermore, there 
was nothing in the content of the Type 1 judgment that would trigger Type 2 to kick in—
the Type 1 judgment was simply an endorsement of a false proposition, something like, 
“The correct response is that 8 and brown should be flipped.” There is nothing within that 
proposition that signals its potential falsity; its potential falsity only comes into view in 
light of some external consideration.  
One line would be to argue that Type 1 judgments are accompanied by feelings of 
confidence, and the extent of that confidence determines whether Type 2 processes are 
recruited. But what about cases where it is the importance of the task that triggers Type 
2? In these cases, one would have to say that running parallel to whichever Type 1 
process is devoted to a particular problem is a second Type 1 process devoted to 
evaluating that problem’s importance.4 Though either confidence or a belief in the task’s 
importance is a potentially plausible trigger of Type 2 processing, either of these would 
be additions to the default-interventionist account. It appears that some additional feature 
would be required if a default-interventionist account wishes to explain what might cause 
Type 2 processes to intervene on default Type 1 judgments. 
In Evans (2009), he claims that “working memory [is] largely recruited by 
preconscious systems,” giving the example of a distracted motorist jarred into 
																																																								
4 I will argue that some of these cases may be like v., where Type 1 has not engaged at all on a 
particular reasoning task.  
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attentiveness by the car in front of him braking suddenly (48). This example, however, is 
not a case of dual process reasoning— if there is any reasoning involved here, it seems 
like a very basic Type 1 spatial reasoning process; no deliberation or hypothetical thought 
was involved. In this earlier work, Evans describes his account as default-interventionist, 
but also proposes that we may also have Type 3 processes, which Type 1 would input 
into directly. Type 3 processes would then determine whether or not Type 2 processes 
needed to be recruited, and, if the Type 2 outputs ultimately disagreed with the Type 1 
outputs, Type 3 processes would resolve that conflict.  
The Type 3 proposal is not worth paying much attention to. Evans himself 
acknowledges that he is only able to define it functionally (2009, 49). In other words, it is 
clear to him that some further mechanism or detail must be added to the default-
interventionist schema in order to explain the recruitment of Type 2 processes, but this 
unexplained triggering condition is the entire basis for proposing Type 3. As such, Type 3 
is either a very unparsimonious solution to the problem facing default-interventionism, or 
it is an empty placeholder for an eventual explanation he hopes will eventually validate 
his account. Evans himself seems to have abandoned Type 3 by his 2013 paper with 
Stanovich. This leaves default-interventionism without any explanation for what 
specifically triggers Type 2 processes to intervene on Type 1 processes. 
 
4. The triggering criterion 
 In the previous section, I argued that we have many reasons to favor a default-
interventionist paradigm along the lines of the accounts developed both by Kahneman 
and by Evans and Stanovich. No existing default-interventionist account, however, offers 
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an explanation for the triggering of Type 2 reasoning. That is, in virtue of what do Type 2 
processes intervene on Type 1 defaults? I find this silence on the part of foregoing 
accounts very troubling: the parsimony enabled by this type of intervention is the crucial 
virtue of this type of dual process model, and it is unclear what explanatory value such a 
model could provide if we are left without any idea of what might trigger Type 2 to 
intervene. 
 I have so far mentioned a few possibilities about what the triggering conditions 
for Type 2 intervention cannot be. It cannot be the case that Type 2 reasoning constantly 
monitors Type 1 reasoning, as this would violate the considerations of cognitive economy 
that motivated the default-interventionist schema to begin with. If Type 2 reasoning 
always ran in the background, its resources could not be said to be conserved by this 
paradigm. If there were some kind of “off-line” monitoring on which Type 2 processes 
could monitor Type 1 processes, it is not clear how these monitoring processes could 
qualify as Type 2 processes at all— they would be neither effortful nor deliberate. 
 It is also not possible that something internal to a belief or judgment output by 
Type 1 could trigger Type 2 intervention. As discussed earlier in this chapter, many of 
the motivating cases for dual process models rely upon the observation that these two 
types of reasoning can output identical judgments— dual process models could be 
construed as answers to the question, “why would this duplication of reasoning function 
exist?” If Type 1 and Type 2 are capable of outputting the same judgment, then it does 




 In the previous chapter, I argued that all that is required for a new belief to count 
as inferred is for the subject to take that new belief to follow from a rational process. 
Furthermore, I argued that a subject’s taking a new belief to follow from a rational 
process requires only the presence of a certain phenomenological datum: the feeling of 
correctness, which I called the assent affect. A subject makes an inference if and only if a 
causal cognitive transition produces a belief accompanied by the assent affect. 
 In this section, I will argue that, if a Type 1 judgment is not accompanied by the 
assent affect, Type 2 intervention is triggered. This absence of the assent affect may carry 
its own phenomenology— there may be a set of uncertainty-based intellectual emotions 
or epistemic feelings that present to the subject when a judgment is reached. In order to 
develop this claim that certain intellectual emotions (or their absence) are the triggers of 
Type 2 intervention, I must first discuss the role of emotions in reasoning in greater 
detail. 
In a recent, unpublished paper called “Reasoning and Emotion, in light of the 
Dual Processing Model of Cognition,” Ronald de Sousa argues that emotions play 
important roles in a variety of reasoning tasks, and that these roles span the two tracks of 
reasoning proposed by dual process models. De Sousa defends this claim with a series of 
cases borrowed from Kahneman’s 2011 Thinking Fast and Slow. Kahneman argues that 
humans are cognitively “lazy,” in the sense that they tend to offer biased and obviously 
false answers to certain types of tasks rather than think through them carefully. In one 
study, Princeton undergraduates were given the prompt along the lines of: “In a lake, 
there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for 
the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the 
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lake?” (Kahneman 2011, 66). Half of the subjects were given the prompt in a clear, easily 
readable font, and the others were given the prompt in a grey, low-quality photocopy that 
was somewhat difficult to read. Subjects who read the prompt in the clear font made an 
error 90% of the time, while subjects who had to strain to read the prompt made an error 
only 35% of the time (ibid).  
Kahneman argues that results like this suggest that humans tend to prefer states of 
“cognitive ease” where only Type 1 processes are deployed. He claims, “These findings 
add to the growing evidence that good mood, intuition, creativity, gullibility, and 
increased reliance on System 1 form a cluster.” I believe that these results are well-
explained by the assent affect, a very general feeling of confidence in one’s judgment. If 
one’s judgments are disposed to be accompanied by the assent affect more readily, they 
will be more inclined to rely upon their Type 1 reasoning resources, without Type 2 
intervention.5  
 Epistemic feelings along the lines De Sousa lays out are precisely the sort of thing 
that might trigger Type 2 intervention. If a subject has a Type 1 judgment that is 
accompanied by the assent affect, or the feeling of correctness, Type 2 processing will 
not intervene.6 If, however, the Type 1 judgment is not accompanied by the assent affect, 
Type 2 processing will intervene. There is a further question, of course, about how to 
describe the absence of the assent affect. I believe that the mere absence of the assent 
affect carries phenomenology: there is something it is like to not be satisfied with a 
judgment. This absence— or the array of feelings that might constitute this absence— is 
																																																								
5 Kahneman’s theorizing along these lines draws heavily upon Norbert Schwartz’s work on 
metacognition (Schwartz et al. 2007). 
6 In the final Chapter 3, I will discuss cases of unconscious rule-following. In order to fully 




all that is required to trigger Type 2 intervention. It also seems, however, that the absence 
of the assent affect alongside a Type 1 judgment might carry further phenomenology: 
confusion, doubt, etc. These epistemic feelings could also serve as triggers for Type 2 
intervention. These further feelings, however, are not universal: what unites them is that 
in each case the subject makes a judgment that is not accompanied by the assent affect. 
 When a subject reasons her way to a new belief, but that belief is not 
accompanied by the assent affect, she has not made an inference. That is, when a 
subject’s fails to reach a response to a math problem using Type 1 processing, she has not 
yet made an inference. The absence of the assent affect will trigger Type 2 intervention; 
those Type 2 processes may yield a judgment that is accompanied by the assent affect— 
a judgment the subject is satisfied with. Only at this point has the subject made an 
inference. If the Type 2 processes still do not produce a judgment that is accompanied by 
the assent affect, Type 2 processes are once again triggered. Type 2 processes will 
reapply themselves until the subject reaches a judgment accompanied by the assent 
affect, or until the subject gives up. In this way, the assent affect and its absence act as 
rational “traffic cops,” directing Type 1 and Type 2 reasoning processes to intervene or 
not, as is required by the situation. 
 
 At this point, I must say more about the nature of the assent affect. In his 2013 
paper “The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology,” Declan Smithies considers the 
phenomenal properties of cognition in considerable depth. He focuses on (a) the 
relationship between the phenomenal properties of cognition and the intentional 
properties of cognition, and (b) the relationship between the phenomenology of cognition 
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and the phenomenology of sensory experience. The second question is entirely outside 
the scope of my present project.  
 With respect to the first question, Smithies identifies two general views. The first 
view, intentionalism, claims that “the phenomenal properties of cognition are necessarily 
connected with, and even identical with, its intentional properties” (Smithies 746). The 
alternative view, which I will call anti-intentionalism, claims that phenomenal properties 
of cognition are related only contingently with the intentional properties of cognition. 
Proponents of intentionalism claim that phenomenal properties play a role in the 
individuation of cognition. It is beyond my present ambition to give an account of how 
every aspect of cognition is individuated: the individuation conditions for states like 
belief may vary considerably in nature from the individuation conditions for intentional 
attitudes or particular types of intentional contents.  
I have, however, given the individuation conditions for inferences in terms of one 
particular phenomenal property of such cognitive events: namely, the assent affect. I am 
agnostic with respect to intentionalism, broadly construed: the view that phenomenal 
experience is relevant and necessary to the individuation of any aspect of our cognition. I 
am arguing for a narrower and more modest version of intentionalism, on which at least 
the category of inference is individuated with respect to the presence of this particular 
phenomenal property of cognitive experience. 
Two individuals may share an identical set of background premise-beliefs, and 
they may arrive at an identical new belief based on these background premise-beliefs. 
The two subjects may differ with respect to whether or not they have made an inference, 
however, based on whether or not the new belief is accompanied by the assent affect. 
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Whether or not the new belief is accompanied by the assent affect— that is, whether or 
not the chain of beliefs can be said to constitute an inference— is a matter of individual 
difference. Some subjects may simply be more likely to be satisfied with their Type 1 
judgments, and so this judgment may constitute an inference for these subjects more 
often.  
 This final note corresponds nicely to one of the pairs of features generally 
associated with Type 1 and Type 2 processing. It is often claimed that individuals are 
largely similar with respect to their Type 1 processing abilities, with differences in Type 
2 processing accounting for differences in cognitive ability. The 2013 Evans & Stanovich 
account, which grounds Type 2 reasoning in reliance on cognitive decoupling, emerges 
very directly from Type 2’s correlation with individual differences. Now, we can say that 
(at least some) individual differences reflect differences in subjects’ dispositions to feel 
the assent affect. Subjects whose Type 1 judgments are less frequently accompanied by 
the assent affect will be less likely to trigger Type 2 intervention, and they will rely upon 
relatively less accurate Type 1 judgments more often. 
 It is very likely that the assent affect can vary with respect to degrees of intensity. 
Some individuals might feel extremely confident that a certain conclusion is right— 
Descartes basking in the glow of the natural light, for example. The same inference, for 
another individual, might yield the assent affect to a lower degree— she will be less 
confident in the output of her judgment, though still confident enough to endorse it. This 
result dovetails very nicely with the observation that there is significant individual 
difference with respect to the application of Type 2 reasoning. It is possible that 
individuals differ in terms of the extent to which they are disposed to feel the assent 
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affect. It is also possible that individuals differ with respect to the threshold of the assent 
affect below which Type 2 reasoning is triggered. For the sake of example, Person A 
might have Type 2 reasoning triggered whenever the assent affect falls below 70%; 
Person B might have a 50% threshold. (Of course, I do not believe that there must be 
literal percentages; these are included in order to demonstrate the point.) Person A is 
more prone to think things over carefully: their Type 2 processes are more readily 
invoked.  
 The assent affect allows us to see how certain contexts or situations might affect 
the triggering conditions for Type 2 reasoning. Situations of great importance arouse 
heightened sensitivity, nervousness, fear, etc.; that is, an array of intellectually relevant 
emotions. These emotions might impact the assent affect itself— e.g., perhaps we are 
more likely to suppress assent when we are very nervous— or these emotions might 
lower an individual’s triggering threshold. If the bar below which Type 2 processing 
triggered is lowered in situations the individual takes to be important, Type 2 processing 
will be triggered more readily. Grounding the triggering of Type 2 reasoning in emotions 
allows us a very natural explanation of why Type 2 is more likely to be invoked in 
“important” situations: these situations are emotionally charged, and adjust the emotional 
triggering conditions for Type 2 intervention. 
 We also now have an explanation for case v., as described in the previous section. 
These were cases in which a subject relied only on Type 2 processing, with no Type 1 
intervention. Imagine a high schooler taking the SAT: he is very nervous, and this 
nervousness might countervail the assent affect— these will be competing emotional 
factors. If the subject’s assent affect is suppressed before he even begins to read the 
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question, he will rely on Type 2 reasoning immediately. A more confident test-taker 
might not have this countervailing nervousness, and so his Type 1 processes might 
engage on his first pass through the question; only if and when he fails to have the assent 
affect will his deliberate Type 2 processes engage. 
 The assent affect comes in degrees to the same extent that confidence in a 
judgment comes in degrees. This does not suggest, however, that reasoning is best 
explained along a spectrum rather than a dichotomized dual process model. There is a 
definite level of “feeling right” below which Type 2 will be triggered. Even if this level 
changes based on context, there will always be a definite point along these lines.  
 Finally, it is worth revisiting cases like iv., in which Type 2 intervention 
“disagrees” with a Type 1 judgment but Type 1 succeeds in control of behavior. Once 
affective attitudes are introduced to the picture, it is easy to see how the emotional force 
of a Type 1 judgment over a Type 2 judgment might allow the Type 1 judgment to 
successfully control behavior. Consider Alfred Mele’s example of a parent who refuses to 
be persuaded that her teenage son is using drugs (2001). Perhaps reasoning through the 
issue via Type 2 rules seems to point towards the son using drugs, but she persists in 
ignoring this evidence in favor of her judgment that she just “knows” her son wouldn’t 
use drugs. The Type 1 judgment that her son is not using drugs is emotionally preferable 
to such a great extent that it overwhelms the usual emotional and subjectively normative 
weight of the Type 2 judgment. Now that emotions and epistemic feelings have entered 
the picture as triggers for preferring both Type 1 and Type 2 attitudes, we can explain 





The appeal of the assent affect as an explanation for triggering 
 I have argued that the assent affect plays the role of a rational traffic cop: when it 
appears alongside a Type 1 judgment, that judgment counts as inferred, and Type 2 
reasoning is not triggered. When it does not appear, this event has its own particular 
phenomenology, and Type 2 reasoning is triggered. My argument, thus, has significant 
theoretical appeal. I identified an egregious explanatory burden left by foregoing default-
interventionist accounts, in that none of them has explained what might cause Type 2 
reasoning to intervene on Type 1 defaults. The presence of absence of the assent affect is 
a very strong candidate to fill this explanatory gap regarding how Type 2 intervention is 
triggered. In the previous chapter, I argued that the assent affect also solved a critical 
problem in accounting for the category of inference: if subjects are often unaware of the 
causal history of an inferred conclusion, then only something like the assent affect could 
explain how it is that a subject “takes” a conclusion to follow from a rational process. I 
have demonstrated that an account of reasoning and inference that includes the assent 
affect can solve multiple theoretical problems at once. 



















 Let us begin by taking stock of what I have covered so far. In the first two 
chapters, I argued that two apparently unrelated puzzles— one about inference, and one 
about dual process models of reasoning— can be solved at once by acknowledging the 
importance of intellectual emotions in reasoning. In particular, the feeling of correctness, 
which I am calling the assent affect, does significant explanatory work in addressing 
these puzzles as soon as it is incorporated into descriptive accounts of reasoning and 
inference.  
The first puzzle, discussed in the first chapter, emerged from Paul Boghossian’s 
powerful observation that inference involves a subject’s “taking” a cognitive transition to 
be a certain way. Boghossian says that a subject must take the premises of her inference 
to support her conclusion. I demonstrated in Chapter 1 that there are many cases in which 
subjects are blind to the premises of an inferred belief. Thus the puzzle: if subjects may 
not know where their inferred beliefs come from, what can this “taking” involve? I 
argued that, for a cognitive transition to count as an inference, a subject must take a belief 
to be the output of a rational process, where that is defined by the belief’s accompaniment 
by the assent affect. A belief counts as inferred because the subject has the feeling that it 
is rational. This is necessary to accommodate the wide range of bad inferences that occur. 
The second puzzle, discussed in the second chapter, emerges from default-
interventionist dual process models. I argued that the default-interventionist paradigm is 
the best explanation for how dual processes might be structured: we generally rely on 
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Type 1 defaults, except when these processes are insufficient to address a prompt or 
stimulus effectively. When the defaults are insufficient, Type 2 processing is triggered. I 
argued that default-interventionism is vastly preferable to other dual process paradigms. 
Unfortunately, every foregoing default-interventionist account I am aware of (Evans 
2009, Evans & Stanovich 2013, Kahneman 2011) is silent with respect to what 
specifically triggers Type 2 intervention. Here we find the second puzzle: what causes 
Type 2 intervention? I argued that the assent affect is well equipped to solve this puzzle 
as well. When a Type 1 default does not yield the assent affect, our Type 2 processes 
intervene, and we think about a problem deliberately and carefully. Explaining this 
triggering via emotions does a tremendous amount of explanatory work. For example, we 
can now say that our heightened attention during important scenarios, like final exams— 
our increased propensity to rely on Type 2 reasoning— occurs because the emotional 
salience of these events countervails the assent affect. That is, the nervousness we feel 
during an exam suppresses our inclination to accept the Type 1 “easy answer” as true 
without thinking things over carefully. 
In the second chapter, I met two of the three explanatory criteria I established for 
dual process models of reasoning. The default-interventionist paradigm meets the 
structure criterion, and the assent affect meets the triggering criterion. I have not, yet, 
explained the fundamentality criterion. This chapter is devoted to this final criterion. 
What is the nature of each type of processing? How do they manipulate a stimulus 
differently such that they are not merely duplicating functionality? My answer to these 
questions will rely on the account of inference I gave in the first chapter and the 
considerations about the structure of dual process models I offered in the second. 
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In building my account of fundamentality, I will draw on the discussion of the 
diversity of types of inference discussed in the first chapter. I will argue that Type 2 
reasoning involves inferences based on rules that are self-revisable within any particular 
instance of reasoning, and Type 1 reasoning involves inferences that are not based on 
self-revisable rules. I will spell out the relevant notion of self-revisability in great detail. 
Among contemporary accounts, the orthodoxy is that Type 1 processing 
corresponds to a set of autonomous, domain-specific processing modules, while Type 2 
reasoning corresponds to a single domain-general processing system flexible enough to 
handle several types of reasoning (Stanovich 2004, 2011; Evans & Stanovich 2013). For 
this reason, I offer self-revisability as a necessary and sufficient condition for an 
inference to qualify as an instance of Type 2 reasoning, and define Type 1 inferences 
simply as those that are not self-revisable. If Type 1 reasoning involves autonomous 
modules, these modules need not rely on the same type of processing; these modules are 
similar only in that they facilitate inferences that are not self-revisable. 
Before discussing my account in more detail in Section 3, I will briefly address a 
few ways that fundamentality has been addressed in the foregoing dual process literature. 
 
2. The basis of the fundamentality criterion 
Dual process accounts generally involve lists of qualitative features associated 
with each type of reasoning. The specific features included on these lists will vary 
depending on the author, but only slightly. In the introduction to their 2009 collection “In 
Two Minds,” Evans & Frankish offer the following list of features they take to appear 




System 1     System 2 
Evolutionarily old    Evolutionarily recent 
Unconscious, preconscious   Conscious 
Shared with animals    Uniquely (distinctively) human 
Implicit knowledge    Explicit knowledge 
Automatic     Controlled 
Fast      Slow 
Parallel     Sequential 
 High capacity     Low capacity 
 Intuitive     Reflective 
 Contextualized    Abstract 
 Pragmatic     Logical 
 Associative     Rule-based 
 Independent of general intelligence  Linked to general intelligence 
     (Evans & Frankish, 2009) 
 
Any particular author might disagree with the inclusion of some of these items; I have no 
objection to the modest claim that these features are typical but non-necessary. If the dual 
process distinction is a real distinction, however, we must say which of these features is 
necessary to each type of process. We must be able to differentiate between Type 1 and 
Type 2 inferences via some consistent basis. 
A wide variety of fundamental explanations of the two types of reasoning have 
been offered in the literature. In the previous chapter, I discussed Sloman’s dual process 
account (1996, 2002), on which System 1 is fundamentally associative and System 2 is 
fundamentally rule-based. Frankish (2009) attempts to map the dual process distinction 
onto the personal/subpersonal distinction. Carruthers (2009) claims that System 2 is a 
“virtual machine” realized out of Type 1 hardware.  
These ways of meeting the fundamentality criterion, and most of the others in the 
literature, are ruled out by the considerations I laid out in the previous chapter. Few of 
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them are compatible with the very promising default-interventionist paradigm, and 
furthermore many of them struggle to explain the fully array of psychological data that 
motivates the dual process distinction. 
In the previous chapter, I mentioned the Evans & Stanovich (2013) answer to the 
fundamentality question when laying out their default-interventionist model. They argue 
that Type 2 reasoning relies upon the faculty of cognitive decoupling: forming a mental 
copy of a representation is a means of entertaining hypotheticals. The autonomous set of 
systems that engage in Type 1 reasoning do not involve cognitive decoupling, on their 
view. I do not think that this claim is entirely incorrect, but I also do not think that it fully 
answers the call of the fundamentality criterion. In the following section, I will show how 
this is the case. 
 
3. The fundamentality criterion and self-revisability 
Let me draw a loose analogy. Suppose I tell a recent Martian immigrant to Earth 
that humans are capable of representing visual space in two different ways. What are 
they, the Martian asks. Well, I say, one is the primary way that visual information enters 
our awareness and helps us respond quickly to our immediate environment, and the other 
is cognitively downstream and helps us navigate the space around us. The first one 
provides information that the second process uses to form its different sort of spatial 
representation. Okay, the Martian might respond, but what are they? We can define the 
first by its primacy, I reply, and the second by its manipulability and the demands it 
places on our working memory. 
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 This scenario, I believe, is roughly akin to defining Type 1 and 2 reasoning in 
terms of Type 1’s autonomy and Type 2’s reliance on working memory or decoupling, as 
Evans & Stanovich do. The Martian’s question would be best answered with the 
information that the first type is egocentric representation, meaning that it represents the 
locations of objects relative to the subject’s position, and the second type is allocentric, 
which represents the locations of objects relative to other objects.  
I do not deny that Type 1 reasoning is autonomous in the relevant sense or that 
Type 2 reasoning places heavy demands on working memory or that it requires 
decoupling.  In fact, I think that these considerations give us strong reason to believe that 
something close to a default-interventionist schema— where scarce and cognitively 
taxing Type 2 resources only intervene when default, “low cost” Type 1 judgments fail— 
is correct. I do think, however, that defining Types 1 and 2 as Evans & Stanovich do fails 
to constitute a response to the most fundamental question about dual reasoning processes: 
how do the two processes manipulate a stimulus differently such that they cooperate? Put 
differently, what is the nature of the reasoning performed by the two processes such that 
they are not merely duplicating functionality? Reliance on working memory is a very 
important datum, of course, but it does not amount to a hypothesis about the intrinsic 
nature of the two types of reasoning. It is of course possible that Evans & Stanovich do 
not aspire to offer such a hypothesis— perhaps they think it is sufficient to say that 
certain qualitative features of the two processes are typical but non-necessary. If we are 
to understand why it might be an evolutionary advantage or normatively better for Type 2 
processes to intervene on Type 1 processes, however, we are owed an explanation for 
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how the way Type 2 processes manipulate an input is fundamentally different than the 
way that Type 1 processes manipulate that same input. 
 In this section, I will argue that Type 2 processing involves the manipulation of 
self-revisable rules: rules that the subject can change during the act of reasoning. Type 1 
processing is, as I have said, most plausibly construed as a set of autonomous processing 
systems. These systems are united under the Type 1 umbrella because they facilitate 
inferences that are not self-revisable in the way that Type 2 processes are.  
 
Revisable rules 
 What does it mean for a rule to be revisable? On my view, the revisability of rules 
is the definitional or fundamental feature of Type 2 inferences. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, the default-interventionist paradigm explains cases in which Type 1 processes 
fail to deliver a satisfying response by saying that these are cases in which Type 2 
processes intervene (though previous authors do not say what it is, specifically, that 
triggers Type 2 intervention). What about when we find the output of a Type 2 process 
unsatisfying? Say, for example, that a college freshman is taking Introductory Logic. 
Perhaps her tutor has taught her to follow the general rule: 
r1: If the main operator of the goal is a negation, proof by contradiction is the  
appropriate strategy. 
Later, the student faces the task: “Given the premises 1. A~C  and 2. A, derive the goal 
~C.” Type 1 processing will not offer any satisfying answer to problems like this that 
demand deliberate Type 2 reasoning.  
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So Type 2 processes are recruited (due the absence of the assent affect, as 
discussed in Chapter 2). First, the student attempts to apply the rule she was taught, and 
begins the proof by assuming “C,” with the intention of deriving a contradiction from that 
assumption. She then realizes that this strategy will not get her a satisfying answer. This 
triggers Type 2 processing to reapply itself; she considers what other rules she knows for 
solving proofs, and realizes that modus ponens can be performed on the two premises. 
There is a question, of course, about what made Type 2 processing reapply itself. Later, I 
will argue that the same sort of thing that triggers Type 2 to intervene on Type 1 defaults 
can also trigger Type 2 to reapply itself, or to fail to be satisfied, when reasoning through 
a certain puzzle. 
 In the relevant case, though, the student’s eventual application of modus ponens 
constitutes a violation of the rule she originally knew. Her eventual success with this 
prompt constitutes revision of the relevant set of rules she is aware of for solving logic 
proofs. One possible revision could be that she replaced the original rule r1 with: 
r2: If the main operator of the goal is a negation, proof by contradiction is the  
appropriate strategy unless there is a modus ponens available in the  
premises given. 
Alternatively, perhaps she does not replace r1 with r2, but instead keeps r1 and introduces 
two new rules: 
 r3: Perform any modus ponens available in the premises given. 
 r4: r3 should be followed before r1. 
In this possibility, r4 is a metacognitive rule governing the application of rules r1 and r3. 
Regardless of whether the subject replaces r1 with r2 or keeps r1 and introduces r3 and 
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r4, what is relevant here is that the rules are revisable. That is, for any Type 2 inference, a 
subject has the option of editing the rule that led them from the input to the judgment if 
the judgment is unsatisfying. This is not the case for the inferences that I believe are 
fundamentally linked with Type 1 processing. If a judgment reached in this way is 
unsatisfying, Type 2 processes must be recruited to reevaluate the input. The Type 1 
judgment cannot be revised in the short term; it can merely be overcome by a Type 2 
judgment, or counter-conditioned in the long term.  
 Jake Quilty-Dunn and Eric Mandelbaum (2015) have recently argued that some 
basic logical rules, like modus ponens, are built into our cognitive architecture, and that 
this fact explains why we are able to make unconscious inferences involving these rules. I 
do not doubt that they are right that rules along these lines are in fact built into our 
cognitive architecture, nor do I doubt that we are able to rely on them unconsciously. 
These built-into-the-architecture rules will not be revisable, and so relying upon them 
will necessarily be a Type 1 process.  
To see the distinction between Type 1 modus ponens and Type 2 modus ponens 
more clearly, imagine that I ask an introductory class to execute a proof, except for the 
sake of this proof modus ponens is not a valid inference rule. Instead, affirming the 
consequent should be used as a valid inference rule. Each time a modus ponens is 
available to the students when solving the proof, they might reach a Type 1 judgment 
following this rule. Their Type 2 processes, however, would overrule this judgment, 
relying on the affirming the consequent rule they have self-revised into validity for the 




 In the first chapter, I argued that the category of inference was much more diverse 
than many authors had previously taken it to be. I argued that defining inferences as 
essentially and necessarily rule-based was not useful, because of the diversity of types of 
rules that different inferences relied upon. In order to demonstrate this diversity, I laid out 
several different types of inference, categorized based on the types of rules they 
apparently relied on. I acknowledged that some of these categories could potentially be 
synthesized into broader categories. This is precisely what I will do now: I believe that 
the types of inference I laid out in chapter one are neatly categorizable as self-revisable 
and non-self-revisable— as Type 2 and Type 1. 
 
Type 2 reasoning: explicit reliance on deductive or inductive rules 
 In the first chapter, I considered the paradigmatic cases of the mathematician and 
the chemist. The mathematician consciously entertains certain premises and a set of 
deductive rules she has learned in order to deduce the next step in her proof. The chemist 
considers her lab results and whether or not they are sufficiently convincing to satisfy an 
inductive generalization. These are paradigmatic inferences in the sense that the subjects 
explicitly consider what might follow from certain beliefs they already hold. I argued in 
the first section that these types of inferences seem to be the type of phenomenon that 
Boghossian and other writers have focused on in building their accounts of inference; 
while I acknowledge that they are paradigmatic, I think that they are also somewhat less 
common than many types of everyday inference.  
It is clear that the rules in either of these paradigmatic cases are revisable in the 
relevant sense. That is, anytime a rule is explicitly relied upon in reaching an inference, 
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that rule is revisable, and that inference is Type 2. The case of the logic student in the 
prior subsection demonstrates that explicit reliance on deductive rules is self-revisable. 
Much the same can be said about the case of the chemist: perhaps she determines that a 
certain type of extrapolation she has relied upon in the past is more fallible than she 
previously realized; she can reassess an inference made using this extrapolation and 
revise that inference. Each of these types of inference should be somewhat 
uncontroversially Type 2. 
 
Type 1 reasoning: associative and probabilistic deductive and inductive inference 
 In the previous chapter, I considered cases of deductive inference that may rely on 
associative or probabilistic reasoning. This was best highlighted by alternative 
explanations of the Wason selection task, also discussed earlier in this chapter as a 
motivating case for dual process models. In this task, subjects fail to correctly assess the 
truth conditions of a card-flipping task involving the material conditional. One (perhaps 
orthodox) explanation of the incorrect response to this task is that subjects are relying on 
a primitive associative matching bias; subjects respond incorrectly by naming the cards 
mentioned in the prompt. An alternative explanation, due to Oaksford and Chater, is that 
the incorrect strategy in the Wason task is in fact a misfire of a generally reliable 
probabilistic Bayesian algorithm— the reasoning on this explanation is deeply ingrained 
and subpersonal. For a more detailed discussion of these alternative possibilities, please 
see section 3.1 of the first chapter. 
 For present purposes, I do not need to resolve whether the common incorrect 
response to the Wason task is best explained as an associative or Bayesian inference. I 
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also do not need to resolve whether all instances of implicit deduction can be explained 
as associative, as Bayesian, or whether there is some preponderance of one versus the 
other in such cases. It is only necessary for my purposes to demonstrate that neither 
associative nor Bayesian inferences would rely on self-revisable rules in the relevant 
sense. Because they do not rely on this type of rule, they are Type 1 inferences. 
 Before I consider the revisability of the rule-following present in these deductive 
cases, I would like to also incorporate everyday inductive reasoning, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Everyday inductive reasoning occurs almost constantly: Hume’s 
discussion of billiard balls makes clear that we expect certain causal principles to obtain 
very frequently in our daily lives. Anytime we make a prediction, a generalization, or 
draw an analogy, we are relying on inductive inference, regardless of whether or not this 
inference is good.  
 As with deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning may rely largely on both 
Bayesian and associative reasoning. Associative reasoning occurs when a certain effect is 
observed as following from a certain cause a sufficient number of times that one can be 
inferred from the other— association is what Hume had in mind when discussing the 
constant conjunction of cause and effect. Bayesian explanations of inductive inferences, 
on the other hand, describe a subject’s ability to predict or generalize based on a limited 
set of prior experiences not in terms of the subjects’ constant conjunction or correlated 
phenomena, but rather in terms of subjectively assessed probabilities of certain outcomes, 
given prior knowledge. In other words, Bayesianism suggests that probabilistic 
algorithms— either innate or developed at a very young age— allow subjects to adjust 
the estimated likelihood of certain conclusions as new evidence is gathered. Bayesianism 
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was discussed at greater length in Chapter 1, in terms of Oaksford and Chater’s 
explanation of apparently poor performance on the Wason selection task. 
At this point, it should become fairly clear that the “rules” guiding associative or 
Bayesian inferences— whether inductive or deductive— are not self-revisable in the 
relevant sense. First, suppose that Oaksford and Chater are correct, and poor performance 
on the Wason selection task is in fact explained by subjects’ relying on generally reliable 
Bayesian principles. When the subject responds incorrectly to the Wason prompt, what 
happens? They are not able to revise the Bayesian principles they relied upon originally; 
in fact, these Bayesian principles are probably unknown to the overwhelming majority of 
subjects, and it seems doubtful that even those subjects who understand Bayesianism 
would be able to alter their deeply ingrained computations. Anecdotally, it seems that 
many subjects may continue to feel the “pull” of their incorrect answer to the Wason 
prompt even if they fully comprehend and endorse a correct deductive answer.7 Bayesian 
inference rules are not revisable in the relevant sense, and as a result, these inferences are 
Type 1. 
Say, on the other hand, that Evans’ associative explanation for incorrect 
performance on the Wason selection task: perhaps subjects are simply used to “matching” 
certain words from the prompt when inferring an answer— at least when they find the 
question challenging and cannot see an answer otherwise. It does not seem that an 
associative rule governing an inference of this type could be revised. Associations can 
only be counter-conditioned in the long-term— by having a large number of experiences 
in which the two phenomena are not correlated. If any inferences, whether inductive or 
																																																								
7 In the next section, I will explain this “pull” in terms of the assent affect, which will follow 
directly from my explanation of the triggering condition of Type 2 reasoning. 
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deductive, rely on associative “rules,” they are not revisable in the relevant sense, and 
they are Type 1 inferences. 
Eric Mandelbaum has recently argued that implicit biases— like the matching 
bias that figures into Evans’ explanation of the Wason task— are not associative, but 
rather are propositionally structured and are responsive to logical rules (2013). In one 
example he discusses, white subjects were given implicit association tests to measure 
their racial biases. Subjects were split into two groups: those who demonstrated racial 
bias towards African-Americans and those who did not. Each of these sub-groups were 
again divided: half of each group was told that the extent of their prejudice, either high or 
low, was in accordance with their peers, and half was told that their prejudice was 
atypical. They were then sent into a room where an African-American individual was 
waiting, and the closeness of the seat the subject chose to this individual was measured. 
Low-prejudice individuals who were told they were atypical sat further away than did 
low-prejudice individuals who were told they were typical in their peer group. High-
prejudice individuals who were told they were atypical sat closer than did high-prejudice 
individuals who were told they were typical in their peers. Mandelbaum interprets the 
findings as demonstrating that the subjects’ implicit bias had been modulated by 
intervention (2013, 20). 
This result should not threaten my self-revisability based account. Mandelbaum’s 
claim based on this study is that certain basic— apparently Type 1—  inferences can be 
modulated by logical intervention. My claim is that Type 1 does not involve the 
manipulation of rules that are self-revisable. This draws out an important distinction 
between self-revisability and mutability. A rule may be propositionally structured and 
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responsive to logical information, but this rule may still not be self-revisable in the 
relevant sense to constitute the basis of a Type 2 inference. The subjects in the study 
above are not able to reflect on the rules that have been modulated, which is necessary for 
the rule to count as self-revisable, on my view. The rule involved in a Type 2 inference 
need not occur to the subject consciously when it occurs, but it must be available to the 
subject post hoc. To state matters even more clearly, a rule counts as self-revisable only if 
a subject is able to identify the rule upon which they were veridically relying after they 
have made the inference.  
  
Gray area cases and automatization  
 There are many cases in which subjects rely on revisable rules implicitly. As 
discussed just above, implicit reliance on self-revisable rules still constitutes Type 2 
inference, as long as subjects are able to post hoc invoke and revise the rule that they 
veridically relied upon. Imagine someone performing a proof in first-order logic with the 
help of a tutor. The student writes down a new line in her proof, and the tutor prompts her 
to reexamine: “what rule were you relying on there?” Suppose that the subject had 
allowed her attention to lapse, and was relying on the deductive rule implicitly. Though 
her inference was bad, it was still an inference, and she is able to explain the rule she was 
relying on. Perhaps she will say something like “I was affirming the consequent, but I 
remember now that that is not a valid inference rule.” She might than explain what she 
ought to have done instead. In this example and many like it, the subject was relying on 
Type 2 reasoning even when she made her original implicit inference: she was relying on 
a revisable rule. Once her attention was drawn to her mistake, she explained the rule she 
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had veridically been relying upon in reaching her inference. That is, she genuinely was 
relying on affirming the consequent; this is not a case in which she is post hoc 
rationalizing her bad inference by identifying a new rule that could have justified it. Bad 
inferences are still inferences, and this is clearly a case of implicit Type 2 inference. 
 Suppose the logic student realized on her own that she made a mistake. Recalling 
the discussion of the assent affect in Chapter 2, we can explain what is going on here in 
some detail. Perhaps the logic student’s Type 2 inference failed to be accompanied by the 
appropriate level of the assent affect. The absence of the assent affect, or perhaps the 
feeling of that absence— something like “doubt”— will trigger Type 2 processes to 
reflect on the rule that led to that judgment, either modifying it or altering its priority 
relative to other rules. Until a Type 2 process yields the assent affect, it can self-revise 
and reapply cyclically. Like Type 1 processes, when Type 2 processes are satisfied, they 
are accompanied by the assent affect, which halts the process of self-revision. 
 This view on the role of doubt appears to be shared by De Sousa and Peirce as 
well. As discussed in Chapter 1, section 5, both De Sousa and Peirce regard doubt as an 
instigator of further inquiry. The “further inquiry” to which they refer may, on my view, 
often or always be constituted by the triggering of Type 2 reasoning. 
 Many dual process models have difficulty explaining another type of gray area 
case: those in which a subject becomes so familiar with some certain category of 
paradigmatically Type 2 reasoning tasks that such inferences begins to lose some of the 
classic features of Type 2 reasoning. That is, an inference that would be slow, deliberate, 
explicit, and effortful for most subjects becomes relatively fast, implicit, and effortless 
89 
	
for a subject who has made very many similar inferences before. I will refer to this 
phenomenon as automatization. 
The best discussion of automatization I have found comes from the 
developmental psychologist Allison Gopnik, in her writing about first- and third-person 
belief ascription. Gopnik’s view, in very broad strokes, is that self-knowledge occurs via 
indirect inference, rather than direct access. That is, we must infer (many of) our own 
mental states in roughly the same way that we infer the mental states of others— based 
on behavioral clues, etc.8 At first pass, Gopnik’s view seems to contradict the intuitive 
notion of first-personal authority: we generally take ourselves to have privileged access to 
our own states. Gopnik argues, however, that well-rehearsed inference types can begin to 
appear psychologically immediate to the subject, even when they are applied in novel 
contexts. 
Gopnik describes a phenomenon that she terms the “illusion of expertise” 
(Gopnik 1993: 335). She notes that in some cases, experts believe that they are 
“perceiving” a phenomenon directly, when in fact they are inferring it indirectly based on 
a robust theoretical framework. This would apply to golfers who account for a good day 
on the course by saying they were “seeing the greens well” or a doctor who “sees” cancer 
in a patient before a full battery of tests has confirmed the diagnosis. In each of these 
cases, the expert is indeed perceiving something— the grain of the turf, the patient’s 
																																																								
8 Gopnik construes her view as claiming that subjects “infer” their own beliefs as opposed to 
“directly accessing” them, as other views would have it. While it does seem to me that the type of 
inference on which Gopnik’s account focuses would qualify as inference on my view of the 
category, it is a tricky question whether or not the “direct access” central to traditional accounts 
of self-knoweldge from which she distinguishes her view would also qualify as inference. In 
other words, I am not sure that I would describe Gopnik’s unique view as unique in virtue of its 
including inferences. This question, while interesting, is beyond my scope here. I am merely 
interested in her account of how any inference might become automatized. 
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physiognomy— but they are actually indirectly inferring the phenomenon— the putt’s 
gradual break to the left, the cancer— based on their background knowledge and 
experience. I want to leave aside Gopnik’s highly controversial conclusion that 
something like this is involved in self-knowledge entirely; her discussion of 
automatization, divorced from the self-knowledge debate, is instructive for present 
purposes. 
 Consider the example of the golfer in terms of Type 1 and Type 2 reasoning. The 
golfer learned how to read greens early in her career: either she was taught certain rules 
or she learned them herself or some combination. Early in her career, when practicing 
putting, she would test out certain rules guiding her putting. “Because of x and y features 
of the species, grain, and moisture of the grass, the putt is likely to require z amount of 
force.” She spends significant time and mental effort considering these rules before each 
putt. These rules are revisable, in that she learns to trust some more than others and 
refines them as she proceeds. She is making Type 2 inferences. Over time, her pre-putt 
inferences become faster and less effortful. In Gopnik’s terms, she becomes an expert. 
Her inferences become psychologically immediate: it appears to her that she infers quite 
a bit about the putt as soon as she looks at the position of her ball on the green.  
 The golfer’s inferences, based on rules about how certain types of putts might 
roll, have become automatized. Are they still Type 2 inferences, or have they become 
Type 1 inferences? My view offers a very natural explanation of these types of cases: 
they are Type 2 inferences if she finds the relevant rules to be revisable, and they are 
Type 1 inferences if they are not revisable. Perhaps, at first, she rapidly infers that a putt 
will be relatively fast: she observes that the green is dry and the hole is downhill from her 
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ball. This time, though, her caddy points out that the golfer’s putts on this course have 
been rolling more slowly than expected. With this confounding factor pointed out, she 
might examine her inference more carefully. Perhaps she can identify the specific 
inference rules that veridically led her to believe her putt would roll quickly (rather than 
post hoc rationalized rules that she uses to justify her original intuition). It is an empirical 
question whether or not these inference rules will be revisable. She may be able to edit 
these rules in light of new information, along the same lines of the logic student who 
edits her proof strategy discussed earlier in this section. She may, on the other hand, find 
that her original inference continues to have pull even if she rejects it in favor of a 
difference based on new, better rules: that is, she may not be able to revise the rules 
governing her inference even if she rejects them. This “having pull” consists of the 
presence of the assent affect, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
 Whether or not an expert in any field would be able to revise inference rules that 
have become automatized strikes me as a case-by-case question. If the expert is able to 
revise the rules governing automatized inferences, the automatized inference is Type 2. If 
she is not, the automatized inference is Type 1. While it may become more or less 
difficult for subjects to identify and revise the rules that were veridically involved in their 
inferences, I believe there will still be a fact of the matter about whether or not they have 
identified and revised the exact rule upon which they relied. That is, the dual process 
distinction will remain a dichotomy, rather than a spectrum, even in these difficult 
automatization cases. 
 
4. The big picture 
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 Implicit within this thesis has been the underlying view that it is near impossible 
to account for our reasoning activity without incorporating the intellectual emotions, and 
that many recent cognitive scientists and philosophers have made their own lives more 
difficult by not doing so. I have argued, in fact, that it is impossible to explain fully how 
our reasoning mechanisms function without invoking some discussion of the feelings that 
are centrally involved.  
Emotions get a bad rap when it comes to thinking: “be less emotional” and “be 
more rational” are frequently taken as synonymous imperatives. While there surely are 
cases in which emotions cloud a subject’s rational judgment, I hope to have demonstrated 
that certain intellectual emotions are crucial to the parsimonious operation of our 
reasoning systems. This dissertation has not offered a full cataloguing of the relevance of 
intellectual emotions to our reasoning activity. On the contrary, I have attempted to be 
very modest in my claims about the assent affect, as I intend it to be compatible with 
many possible connection points in further research. Still, by incorporating a spare 
version of a single emotional feature of our reasoning, I have been able to fill in gaps in 
previous accounts of inference and of the structure of our reasoning systems. I suspect 
that further incorporation of intellectual emotions into the cognitive science of reasoning 
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